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The University of Texas at Tyler 
2015 
 
Noting internment’s nearly ubiquitous connection with the World War Machine, 
The Rise and Fall of the World War Machine examines implications for political 
community.  A postmodern interpretive analysis approach seeks to overcome the 
constraints of axiomatic designs to ensure that the often hidden movement of internment 
comes to light.  Giles Deleuze and Felix Guattari demonstrate the rise of the World War 
Machine, a global collection of state war machines that use war as a means to propagate 
confinement through internment.  Giorgio Agamben observes that a hidden 
manifestations of interment encroach into contemporary political life.  Examining Michel 
Foucault’s account of panopticon provides a means of examining hidden interment.  
Deleuze and Guattari present an alternative to internment in their concept of a Body 
without Organs (BwO) entering a plane of immanence.
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Prolegomenon 
 
Institutionalized confinement gives rise to a science of confinement that in turn 
transcends the state emerging as a World War Machine.  The World War Machine 
subverts the state through the act of internment, creating both visible and hidden forms of 
confinement.  As the science of confinement relies on labeling practices, of labeling 
individuals and placing them in separate categories, a global atmosphere of confinement 
ascribes manageable definitions to all life.  Jnana yoga, or wisdom yoga, and its practice 
of discernment gives rise to the principal of omnipresence, a potentiality to be all things 
and at once no particular thing.  Omnipresence presents a means of confronting and 
overcoming confinement.  Dynamic possibility overcomes confinement. 
Labeling practices inherent in confinement require that individuals have an ability 
to know and understand the categories they embody.  Foucault elucidates the production 
of knowledge and the kind of individual produced by knowledge.  Foucault credits 
Nietzsche with opening the way for the discussion of knowledge on the production of 
subjects able to understand knowledge (Foucault, Power/Knowledge 8). Foucault traces 
the movement of knowledge as confinement through the individual.  He notices in the 
movement of confinement a self-perpetuating machinery whereby the confined sustains 
the act of confinement by learning the knowledge essential to confinement.  Through 
confinement a person learns the definitional schemes necessary for confinement to 
continue.  As Foucault traces the movement of confinement, he uncovers the way in 
which confinement employs repeating definitions that ultimately work to intern those
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subject to such definitions (History of Madness 331).  As Foucault makes clear the 
development and proliferation of confinement, Deleuze and Guattari lay bare the 
movement confinement makes away from centralization within the state and toward a 
global movement of confinement.  Deleuze and Guattari refer to the globalization of state 
technologies of control as the World War Machine (Thousand Plateaus 422).  The World 
War Machine is Deleuze and Guattari’s term for a tendency of state war machines to 
collectivize in creating world order through war.  The World War Machine enacts order 
through war by collectivizing and repurposing state war machines to generate 
confinement on a global scale.  The individual caught in the grasp of the World War 
Machine faces perpetual internment.  The World War Machine marks perpetual 
internment.  Even when internment does not appear readily visible through the existence 
of internment camps, the World War Machine remains in operation through what 
Agamben refers to as the logic of the camp.  The logic of the camp is the logic that drives 
internment (Agamben, Homo Sacer 58).  As The Rise and Fall of the World War 
Machine examines internment’s implications for political community it finds that the 
logic of the camp permeates hidden manifestations of internment throughout virtually all 
modern political life.  As Foucault illustrates the relationship between knowledge of 
confinement and confinement, Agamben underscores that relationship in his idea of the 
logic of the camp by demonstrating that internment camps rely on a logic of internment.  
Therefore, even when internment camps are not visible, the logic that internment camps 
rely on still pervades throughout societies infested by the World War Machine.   
One response to the pervasive logic of the camp is Peter Marchand’s account of 
Jnana yoga.  Jnana yoga presents new possibilities for unconfined space to emerge.  As a 
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person realizes unconfined space a person more and more becomes what Deleuze and 
Guattari refer to as a Body without Organs.  Deleuze and Guattari use the term Body 
without Organs to describe an individual that remains undefined by category and 
tabulation (Anti-Oedipus 150).  The Body without Organs moves into what Deleuze and 
Guattari call the plane of immanence, an indefinable space of being as pure movement 
(Anti-Oedipus 154).  The Body without Organs discovers a dimension of space unbound 
by limitation or tabulation.  As the Body without Organs enters the plane of immanence 
the BwO discovers a space of openness from which the BwO sabotages the space of 
confinement employed by the World War Machine.  By overcoming spaces of 
confinement, Martin Luther King’s understanding of The Beloved Community embodies 
an image of what political community might look like in the plane of immanence. 
Chapter One forms the theoretical framework that the subsequent chapters rely on 
by expanding our understanding of the way that technologies of confinement emerge as a 
science of confinement, a science dedicated to confining individuals through 
categorization.  For example, Foucault shows how as leprosy all but disappeared from 
medieval life the houses used to exclude leprosy from society remained and created a 
space of confinement for social outcasts, specifically those labeled by society as insane 
(Hutton 253).  The leprosy houses were transformed into mad houses and in that space 
the mad houses brought into existence technologies used to confine the insane.  
Technologies of confinement like the straight jacket emerge in the space of the madhouse.  
The straight jacket causes in the insane a confinement in motion.  As madness became a 
social concern, the technologies of confinement associated with the mad houses opened 
up in society (Foucault, History of Madness 431).  A science of confinement emerged in 
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order to manage and develop technologies of confinement.  Foucault’s work shows how 
confinement moves from one or more institutions into others, how confinement changes 
those institutions, and what that transformation looks like.   
The movement of confinement intimately relates to the construction of the 
individual in so much as knowledge production shapes our fundamental understanding of 
reality.  The production of truth in turn produces the sciences that produce subjects able 
to understand what has been produced (Foucault, History of Madness 331).  Confinement 
produces subjects able to understand and accept confinement.  Confinement creates 
subjects and, through labeling practices, places them into roles within society meant to 
perpetuate those very modes of confinement and subject production.  Foucault traces the 
formation of the subject of knowledge through Nietzsche’s assertion that “[i]n some 
remote corner of the universe, bathed in the fires of innumerable solar systems, there 
once was a planet where clever animals invented knowledge.  That was the grandest and 
most mendacious minute of universal history” (Foucault, “Truth and Juridical” 6).  
Nietzsche’s explanation of knowledge as an invention opens the space for Foucault to 
discuss knowledge in terms of a reproducible scheme of power production and 
maintenance that ultimately constitutes both the individual and the individual’s 
relationship with confinement.  Foucault’s work provides an image of confinement in 
motion, enabling us to understand how the science of confinement has moved through the 
state.  The science of confinement subverts the state, using the state’s resources to 
develop into a macro level of confinement, a level of confinement no longer limited to 
the mad house alone or to the societies that birthed the madhouses.  By subverting the 
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state, the science of confinement is developed into a body of confinement that operates 
on a global level, what Deleuze and Guattari refer to as the World War Machine.   
Deleuze and Guattari understand the concept of a war machine as power in 
motion, understood generally as propulsion of movement or an ability to move in a 
particular direction, in a series of complex and strategic situations (Thousand Plateaus 
393).  A war machine is therefore a set of strategies utilized to facilitate movement.  
Deleuze and Guattari document the resultant product of the nomad war machine, 
strategies applied by nomadic peoples to promote sporadic movement through an 
undefined and ultimately decentralized collection of power, crashing into the state and 
becoming integrated into the state apparatus by what Deleuze and Guattari call the royal 
science (“Treatise on Nomadology” 290-291).  Understood generally, the royal science, 
royal in terms of official and sanctioned, is a system of knowledge production of 
categorization through exclusion and separation, born out of the science underlining 
confinement.  Bonta and Protevi describe royal science as an axiomatic science that 
defines figures according to fixed characteristics (24).  “Royal science” Pickering writes, 
“is finished science, cold, rigid, formalized, and finalized…a given repository on which 
projects of government can draw” (155).  The royal science uses authoritarian 
categorization as its organizing principle.  The state and the royal science it employs 
reorients the nomad war machine and turns it into a motile location of confinement.  This 
act gives birth to the World War Machine, a global body of confinement.  As the state 
takes up the war machine and transforms it into its own, the war machine becomes a 
locus of confinement. It then overtakes the state apparatus, shifting power away from the 
state and toward the World War Machine (Deleuze and Guattari, “Treatise on 
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Nomadology” 290-291).  As the state takes the nomad war machine into itself the war 
machine becomes something altogether more monstrous and more powerful than the state.  
The nomad war machine does not seek out war for the sake of war and only comes upon 
it; the World War Machine embodies perpetual war (Deleuze and Guattari, “Treatise on 
Nomadology” 279). 
The World War Machine does not entirely replace the state but rather reorients it 
to the World War Machine’s aims, goals, and overall strategies.  As the World War 
Machine takes over the state apparatus it also takes over the royal sciences and other 
strategic means of state dominance.  To sustain its existence the World War Machine 
often initiates wars between the various strategic systems that it dominates and at other 
times overtakes systems not yet subservient to it creating in their place perpetual war.  
The World War Machine makes perpetual war within itself, within the systems of states 
that it encompasses, as a way of reorganizing and defining space.  The World War 
Machine uses perpetual war as a means of uncovering its enemy, the unspecified and 
ultimately undefined and unlabelled individual (Deleuze and Guattari, Thousand Plateaus 
422).   
Chapter two notes that wherever one finds the World War Machine to be active in 
initiating war one also finds the internment, the institutionalized confinement, of citizen 
populations.  Where one finds internment in a given area one witnesses walls constructed 
around a pre-existing system of a hidden yet perpetual internment of populations.  
Examining the occurrence of camps used to intern citizen populations during three wars 
in the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries illustrates the relationship between the 
World War Machine’s local wars and the internment of citizen populations.  In each 
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instance, most if not all of the populations interned posed no clear and present threat to 
the safety of their respective states.  That the civilians interned posed no danger gives 
credibility to the idea that internment does not occur as a response to any real issues of 
safety but rather occurs wherever the World War Machine makes war.  The scope of 
chapter two widens at the realization that where one finds interment one finds what 
Giorgio Agamben refers to as a hidden matrix of internment.  More clearly, it signifies 
the perpetual presence of a wide and fluid internment camp causing a kind of metaphoric 
death for individuals living within the World War Machine. 
What Agamben refers to as the logic of the camp exposes the hidden matrix of 
internment (Homo Sacer 58).  The logic of the camp marks the pervasive logic of the 
science of confinement to which all interned individuals are subject through internments 
use of category and subsequent confinement.  The logic of the camp creates a zone of 
indistinction occupied by life and death.  A zone of indistinction occurs when concepts or 
a set of concepts no longer resemble distinct ideas and rather are so closely related that 
each concept resembles the other.  Through the logic of the camp politics and death no 
longer exist without the other, wherein there occurs an abandonment of life over to an 
existence that signifies only death (Agamben, Homo Sacer 40-41).  The logic of the camp 
constitutes a zone of indistinction whereby politics and death occupy the same space.  
Later in chapter two, Foucault’s understanding of panoptic power provides an example of 
internment operating in often unseen ways. 
Chapter three concludes The Rise and Fall of the World War Machine by 
presenting a means of moving about in the world free of definitional constraints, free of 
labeling practices, and ultimately free of confinement.  Chapter three presents a strategy 
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of confronting the World War Machine, and the technologies of confinement that drive it, 
through our becoming what Deleuze and Guattari refer to as the Unspecified Enemy.  
The Unspecified Enemy is a being of possibility and openness.  Deleuze and Guattari 
argue that “The definition of the Unspecified Enemy testifies to this: “multiform, 
maneuvering and omnipresent. . . of the moral, political, subversive or economic order, 
etc.” (Thousand Plateaus 422).  The Unspecified Enemy assumes diversity in movement 
such that the World War Machine and the labeling practices it perpetuates remain unable 
to overcome it.  The physician that mends enemy soldiers, the teacher that empowers 
peasants, the police officer that demonstrates kindness, these are all the Unspecified 
Enemy.  Omnipresence, a being’s ability to move beyond the constraints of category and 
tabulation, poses a real danger to the World War Machine and ultimately constitutes the 
potential for liberation from the logic of the camp.  Pure openness, an intention to engage 
the world without controlling it, marks omnipresence, pure possibility, and the voiding of 
the confining definitions of the royal science, of the entire science of confinement.  
Deleuze and Guattari provide an image of moving resistance, resistance in perpetual and 
indefinable motion, in the form of the Body without Organs, or BwO, which they identify 
as a body removed from the dualistic principles of the royal science.   
The process of overcoming the confinement of the World War Machine unfolds 
through a system of meditation meant to shift one’s perspective away from categorical 
thought toward omnipresence.  Jnana yoga describes omnipresence as an infinite reality 
beyond limitation (Vivekananda 38). Politically, omnipresence indicates an ability to 
move beyond the limiting categorization of the World War Machine.  Through 
omnipresence a person is no longer static, separate, and individuated from all other 
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beings, rather a person moves about in the world as a location of possibility.  The 
omnipresent person occupies all possible manifestations of space.  Human beings are not 
the sum of some mechanized list of parts.  We are locations of dynamic possibility.  We 
find an example of this sense of human being in Jnana yoga. The yogi Peter Marchand’s 
work with Jnana yoga serves as a basis for understanding omnipresence and how a person 
can realize her fundamental being.  In Marchand’s work the individual is not individuated 
from life, but rather constitutes living possibility. 
Deleuze and Guattari envision the omnipresent individual as a Body without 
Organs, a BwO.  At no point does one find in the BwO systemic pattern or authoritative 
tabulation.  In other words, the BwO is not caught up in the logical assumptions of the 
World War Machine.  The BwO presents an alternative to the World War Machine.  The 
Body without Organs represents pure being in possibility, a system of life not defined by 
the parts, hence a Body without Organs.  Deleuze and Guattari imagine a body able to see 
with its stomach and dance on its head (Anti-Oedipus 150-151).  Deleuze and Guattari 
refer to the Body without Organs not so much as a body removed of its organs but a body 
removed of definitional confinement.   
The Body without Organs allows a person to realize her own being in what 
Deleuze and Guattari call a plane of immanence.  Deleuze and Guattari describe the plane 
of immanence as a state of both movement and rest from which all speeds and slownesses 
appear (Thousand Plateaus 266).  The plane of immanence marks the plane from which 
all movement comes into the world.  Deleuze and Guattari write, “[o]r rather it is a 
question of a freeing of time, Aeon, a nonpulsed time for a floating music, as Boulez says, 
an electronic music in which forms are replaced by pure modifications of speed” 
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(Thousand Plateaus 267).  The plane of immanence replaces the forms of confinement 
with a politics of open movement.  The plane of immanence implies a destratification of 
the modes of confinement propagated by the World War Machine.  Whereas the World 
War Machine defines things, individuals, and places by placing them into separate 
categories, the plane of immanence removes the categorical boundaries used to separate 
the world.  In the plane of immanence the yogi pulls back all masks and her body 
becomes a BwO, pure relations of speed and slowness between particles.  The plane of 
immanence deterritorializes and desubjectifies (Deleuze and Guattari, Thousand Plateaus 
270).  The yogi occupying the plane of immanence is therefore able to deterritorialize the 
confinement of the World War Machine and desubjectify individuals confined by the 
World War Machine.  The yogi reinvigorates politics out of a zone of indistinction with 
death and into a new zone of pure possibility, into a plane of immanence.  To live in the 
plane of immanence is to live as a being of deterritorialization, a being that is not only 
deterritorialized but a being that in its very movement deterritorializes striated space 
around it.  Martin Luther King is one such figure that in his movement deterritorialized 
segregated space.  His understanding of The Beloved Community embodies an image of 
what political community might look like in the plane of immanence. 
To live in the plane of immanence is to be the enemy of the World War Machine 
and is, by the nature of one’s existence, a continuous confrontation with the World War 
Machine and the logic of the camp that it employs.  In the plane of immanence one 
emerges as the Unspecified Enemy, the individual that through her omnipresence 
confronts the World War Machine by causing all things which were previously known 
and controlled for to re-emerge in the world as dynamic and fluid speeds of life.
11 
 
Chapter One 
 
The Science of Confinement 
 
Foucault examines the transformation of houses of leprosy into insane asylums as 
a means of demonstrating the way in which the practices of confinement in insane 
asylums institutionalized confinement in the modern world.  As the space and segregation 
practices of leprosy houses transformed over time into institutions used for the care and 
housing of the mentally insane there emerged entire technologies of confinement.  
Madness, and so alongside it the technologies dedicated to confining it, came into view in 
the modern world and so there came to be a science dedicated not only to madness but to 
confinement more generally.     
As the institutionalization of confinement was transformed into a science 
dedicated to the technologies of confinement, individuals in the modern world came to 
understand and ultimately accept confinement.  Understood in terms of the asylum, the 
production of knowledge took on a new function as the production of the knowledge of 
confinement.  As the science of confinement produces individuals accepting of 
confinement it produces individuals able and willing to participate in and therefore 
perpetuate their own confinement.  While confinement does not occur naturally in human 
self-understanding, the science of confinement manufactures individuals that accept their 
own confinement and invents humans capable of understanding confinement.   
As the state came to employ the science of confinement there emerged what 
Deleuze and Guattari refer to as the royal science, a science which categorizes, segregates, 
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and defines the world around it.  Through the royal science, royal in terms of official and 
sanctioned, overtaking the apparatus of war, a global machinery of war recognized by 
Deleuze and Guattari as the World War Machine subverts the state.  The World War 
Machine, the institutionalization of confinement on a global scale, subverts states by 
using state apparatuses to promote and sustain confinement aimed at producing world 
order, a global order understood as confinement through classification, segregation, and 
control over the entire world.  The World War Machine creates and sustains wars within 
itself as a means of promulgating world order as war invites into populations systems of 
visible confinement. 
 
1.  Perpetual Confinement 
Confinement is a function of modern institutions even as the cosmetic purposes of 
various institutions change over time.  Foucault illustrates how medieval lazar houses, 
houses that confined and segregated lepers away from the general population, became a 
model for the segregation and confinement of other social outcasts long after the lazar 
houses lost their original form as a segregator of lepers (Hutton 253).  Through the 
transformation of lazar houses into asylums Foucault’s work underscores the process by 
which confinement emerged as the institutional norm in modern society.  In Madness and 
Civilization, Foucault relates that from the High Middle Ages to the end of the Crusades, 
leprosy houses multiplied all over Europe.  He notes that at one time there existed as 
many as nineteen-thousand leprosy houses throughout Christendom.  France had more 
than two-thousand in 1226 when Louis VIII established the lazar house law, with forty-
three in the various dioceses of Paris alone (Foucault, History of Madness 3-4).  In the 
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twelfth century England and Scotland opened two-hundred and twenty lazar houses, 
houses inhabited by a million and a half lepers (Foucault, History of Madness 5).   
When Edward III ordered an inquiry into the hospital of Ripon in England in 1342 
the inquiry found no lepers residing there.  By 1434 only two beds remained in reserve 
for lepers at the hospital founded by Archbishop Puisel in the twelfth century.  Foucault 
records similar events at other lazar houses where by the sixteenth century they had no or 
only few lepers (Foucault, History of Madness 5). Saint-Germain and Saint-Lazare 
housed the largest leprosy populations.  By the fifteenth century onward they housed no 
more lepers.  Within a century Saint-Germain turned into a reformatory for young 
criminals and Saint-Lazare housed only one leper.  Foucault writes, “It was a pleasure to 
celebrate the disappearance of leprosy: in 1635 the inhabitants of Reims formed a solemn 
procession to thank God for having delivered their city from this scourge” (History of 
Madness 4).  Of the leprosy houses’ transition into other houses of segregation, 
madhouses etc., Foucault writes, “From the fourteenth to the seventeenth century, they 
would wait, soliciting with strange incantations a new incarnation of disease, another 
grimace of terror, renewed rites of purification and exclusion” (History of Madness 3). 
As the lazar houses emptied, their form began to take on new meaning.  The 
segregation of the lazar houses created a space of confinement later used for housing the 
insane.  No longer did they segregate lepers from society but rather segregated the mad, 
the criminal, and other new social specters.  Hutton writes that although lazar houses 
turned into madhouses their function as institutions of exclusion, of confinement, 
remained unchanged (253).  Vagabonds, criminals, and madmen would fill the role of the 
leper at the segregation houses.  Long after lepers disappeared and the lazar houses no 
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longer functioned as localities of segregation for lepers, exclusion remained for new 
categories of segregation (Foucault, History of Madness 6).  Before leprosy would 
disappear, society first inscribed upon the leper a condition and moved him to spaces of 
confinement reserved for people not operating within the norm, a space that would 
remain long after the leper finally vanished. 
Foucault writes that the function of segregation that the lazar houses took on 
remained within society although at times with new meaning and within altogether new 
cultures (History of Madness 7).  He finds in the lazar-houses-turned-madhouses 
simultaneous segregation and reintegration.  The segregated individual identifies at once 
with both segregation from his or her former self and reintegration into a new mode of 
being characterized by exclusion.  The power that separated and reshaped the lazar 
houses also separated and reshaped those consigned to the madhouse.  Until then, 
madmen led a wandering existence.  Towns would occasionally drive them outside of 
town-limits where the madmen would wander in the countryside, sometimes entrusted to 
a group of merchants or pilgrims (Foucault, History of Madness 8).  Cities also frequently 
handed madmen over to boatmen.  In 1399 for example the city of Frankfurt instructed 
sailors to rid the city of one such madman who walked around the town naked.  Foucault 
writes, “What matters is that the vagabond madmen, the act of driving them away, their 
departure and embarkation do not assume their entire significance on the plane of social 
utility or security…So many signs that the expulsion of madmen had become one of a 
number of ritual exiles” (History of Madness 10).   
The madman’s voyage represents division and absolute passage, segregation and 
reintegration.  Foucault illustrates the recurrent movement of exclusionary practices in his 
15 
 
example of the madman.  The madman experiences simultaneous inclusion and exclusion.  
Through inclusion into the space of the boat the madman enters a space shaped by 
exclusion from the city (Foucault, History of Madness 11).  As the madman embarks on 
his journey the madman carries forward the exclusionary practices that define his voyage 
away from the city and into the aquatic unknown.  The madman comes into view as the 
prisoner of the passage.  As the madman remains confined to the ship with no way of 
escape, the madman opens up to the river and to the sea and to the great uncertainty that 
appears external to everything.  Foucault writes of the madman, “He is a prisoner in the 
midst of what is the freest, the openest of routes: bound fast at the infinite crossroads.  He 
is the passenger par excellence:  that is, the prisoner of the passage” (History of Madness 
11).  The practices of exclusion today retain a similar form of simultaneous segregation 
and reintegration.  A label of “abnormal” segregates an individual from normal society 
while reintegrating him or her into spaces of inferiority (Macedo and Marti 54).  Labels 
of insane, homeless, and sick for example limit an individual’s ability to move around in 
society and place the individual in pre-defined spaces of confinement such as asylums, 
shelters, and hospitals. 
Until the lazar houses were re-managed into madhouses, expressing the symptoms 
of madness gave an individual over to uncertainty, an uncertainty delineated and 
ultimately defined, but consignment to a space of uncertainty nonetheless.  With the 
transformation of the lazar houses, segregation would no longer give madness over to 
uncertainty, even a spatially well-defined uncertainty.  Rather, madness in the insane 
asylum came as a parceling out of the body and soul of the mad, fragmenting man not 
only from himself but from reality (Foucault, History of Madness 93).  For the individual 
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labelled as mad, separation from reality characterizes a symptom of segregation rather 
than a symptom of madness. The madman in the asylum no longer retains any connection 
to reality but only tabulation and dissection.  The asylum relentlessly dissects the 
madman’s body and mind into distinct categories of insanity whereby the madman 
resembles only a series of tabulation, a series of calculated categories of insanity.  The 
asylum disconnects the madman from his body and mind such that he loses all sense of 
connection with reality.  The madman experiences extreme segregation from reality not 
only in the spatiality of the madhouse but also through a segregation of the parts of his 
body and soul. 
Of the manifestation of madness as a confinement and segregation, Foucault 
writes that medical thought and confinement had emerged in the classical world as 
unrelated concepts (History of Madness 426). Yet as the knowledge of diseases expanded 
so too did the knowledge of diseases of the mind and a physical image of madness came 
into view, an image symbolized by confinement.  By the end of the eighteenth century 
the image of madness gave the first indication of a convergence of medical thought and 
confinement (Foucault, History of Madness 426).  There occurred no moment of birth for 
this merging, not even a sudden realization that the medical and the confined had joined 
together to result in a kind of ultimate confinement.  The materialization of a medical 
necessity for confinement of madness developed slowly, although continuously, over 
time.  Exclusion manifested in social assistance programs such as mental hospitals, 
restructured along psychological and moral grounds (Foucault, History of Madness 426-
427).  Foucault notes that as sickness and poverty remained private affairs, madness took 
on a public status requiring a space of isolation to protect the public (Foucault, History of 
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Madness 427).  Madness therefore took on a visible psychological role in society.  
Madness no longer remained a private matter or a matter shipped off to another town; 
madness turned into a moral imperative, a social ill society felt it had a moral obligation 
to contain.  More specifically, the confinement and long term internment of madness 
embodied a moral imperative. 
The development of madhouses marks a point in history where madness “slides 
into a mythology where reason and unreason found simultaneous expression” (Foucault, 
History of Madness 430).  As the moral imperative for the confinement of madness began 
to materialize, Foucault asks whether or not the asylum would treat those seemingly 
inflicted with madness as prisoners or if the asylum would treat them as invalids with no 
connection to the world around them (History of Madness 426).  What he found is that 
the two approaches combined to comprise the modern asylum (Foucault, History of 
Madness 426).  As the lazar houses were transformed into madhouses they remained 
what they always were, a complex scheme directing control on those interned (Foucault, 
History of Madness 430).  What Foucault calls unreason, Cynthia Erb refers to as an 
“incoherence of subjectivity.”  Since the madman identifies himself incoherently, society 
cannot place upon him an existing label and so invents the label of madness to give him 
(Erb 47).  Unreason meets the logic of the madhouse and in the madhouse unreason and 
reason merge as a function of confinement where both synergize to reinforce confinement.  
As a new form of unreason emerges the logic of the madhouse employs a new form of 
reason to confine it.  The modern asylum severed inmates from the world. 
Confinement was transformed into a pure form, a form used and reused by a 
multitude of networks of socio-political institutions.  Foucault uses the term “pure form” 
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to indicate a category so seemingly fundamental as to exist with or without the things that 
surround it (Archeology of Knowledge 104).  As the image of the madhouse appeared 
more frequently in society in relation to new found categories of medical madness, 
society purified the form of exclusion by regarding it positively, by regarding it as a thing 
society should desire (Foucault, History of Madness 431).  As more madhouses were 
opened exclusion took on more and more roles in society.  Foucault likens pure exclusion, 
a kind of simultaneous exclusion and inclusion through confinement, to a negative zone 
found at the limits of the state, a zone that seeks to substantiate a space where society can 
put its own internment into circulation.  Pure exclusion is exclusion occurring in a space 
designed for exclusion.  Pure exclusion occurs as society works at its own confinement.  
In the pure exclusion of the madhouse, increasingly no longer a central spatial location, 
experts treated alienation and a loss of connection to the world as symptoms of madness 
rather than necessary and predictable symptoms of confinement.  The diagnosis of 
alienation couples with a suggestion of more confinement (Foucault, History of Madness 
431).  Confinement appears as a solution for alienation while, at the same time, 
confinement itself remains the predictable, although unspoken, cause of alienation.  
Cynthia Erb observes that mental illness no longer functions in society as an exception 
but rather marks the present era in that at some point in almost everyone’s life they 
experience some degree of what society has deemed mental illness (47).  As society took 
addressing mental illness upon itself as a moral imperative and over time widened the 
scope of mental illness, virtually all people and the institutions they inhabit opened up to 
the confinement of the madhouse. 
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With the madhouse, what began as a social reform of confinement became a focal 
point for the deep truths of madness.  The operators of the asylums missed how the 
asylums alienated the mad in the first place, with the confinement of the asylum 
embodying the very nature of the madman’s alienation.  Confinement was reordered into 
a relation to the forms to which it had given birth (Foucault, History of Madness 438).  
As confinement was reordered into a socio-moral tendency to address madness, madness 
took on new meanings whereby a labeling of madness meant a de facto loss of 
psychological function.  A symptom of confinement, the madman’s appearance as out of 
touch with reality emerged as evidence of the madman’s psychological condition of 
alienation, in turn requiring more confinement (Foucault, History of Madness 438-439). 
In other words, the cure causes the symptoms.  As confinement becomes a defining 
feature of modern institutions it creates widespread alienation where the cure involves 
more segregation and so more widespread alienation.   
The asylums mark a shift away from punishment to a focus on models of 
knowledge and ultimately of truth designation.  Foucault remarks that chains no longer 
marked the most visible symbol of order in the asylum, a symbol of absolute restriction, 
but rather the straight-jacket.  The straight-jacket as a symbol embodies not a 
humanization of the chains, but rather a restriction of play.  Whereas chains bind an 
individual to a particular location, the straight-jacket binds an individual’s interaction 
during movement.  The individual may move within the confines of the asylum but 
remains unable to interact with the asylum.  The straight-jacket shuts off access to the 
world, all the while allowing the restrained individual to still observe the world.  The 
straight-jacket embodied a symbol of fluid restriction, a restriction always in motion and 
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always somewhere between liberty and its limits.  The straight-jacket, only tightening 
when the mad acted violently, offered an illusion of liberty from the restrictions of chains 
and yet never operated in the space of liberty but always just at its limits (Foucault, 
History of Madness 439).  For Foucault, the straight-jacket symbolizes the fluid 
restriction of the modern world.  We move around in and observe the world, yet the 
segregation of confinement alienates us from the world. 
In the modern world, madness escaped the random anonymity that marked its 
definition, now occupying a space in time and in a directed order.  In the modern world, 
madness is tabulated.  The unreason of vagabonds and other social outcasts met the 
reason of the asylum.  No longer did madness occur as an accident, rather it had taken 
into itself new meanings that marked it as an autonomous institution.  Madness no longer 
appeared as a chance occurrence limited to the asylum, but rather the institution of the 
asylum crept into the daily existence of modern life as more and more institutions of 
confinement marked the modern world, including schools, mental hospitals, prisons, etc.  
Madness, and the inherent confinement associated with it, began to pervade life, no 
longer bound by the limitations of unreason but rather taking into itself scientific reason 
as a second order of its meaning.  Confinement opened the asylum to the world (Foucault, 
History of Madness 442). 
Madness, or more specifically the form of confinement and its institutionalization, 
took into itself a new mode of visibility.  The mad and the non-mad came face-to-face 
with one another, just as reason and unreason had joined in a new form of confinement.  
Madness had shed everything that hid it from sight.  The asylum had in the same 
movement created an almost imperceptibly close proximity and yet also a chasm of 
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distance between confinement and reason, a movement that on Foucault’s account would 
never reverse (Foucault, History of Madness 443).   
Foucault’s understanding of madness is not without its detractors.  Lawrence 
Stone for example critiques Foucault’s work on madness, arguing that Foucault’s 
description of the moral care of the mad as an issue of control leads toward an argument 
of conspiracy and plot.  Stone argues that while Foucault does not himself directly 
participate in conspiracy theory, Foucault’s arguments logically lead to understanding 
enlightenment institutions as locations of conspiracy.  Stone characterizes Foucault’s 
approach to institutions as a “dominance and control” model.  The “dominance and 
control” model, Stone argues, oversimplifies history and explains how Foucault’s over 
reliance on ideas like control leads Foucault to understanding treatment as causing 
alienation (The New York Review of Books). 
In response to Stone’s critique Barry Smart writes, “To attribute to Foucault the 
view that an historical event was the product of a conspiracy…is to completely 
misunderstand his project” (56-57).  Foucault’s conception of historical events 
encompasses much more than mere repressive sovereigns and rather incorporates a 
multiplicity of causes, discourses, and social practices.  Smart writes that charging 
Foucault with creating a mere social control model lacks substance (57).  Foucault is not 
inquiring about the beginnings of social control; rather, Foucault seeks to understand how 
humans are formed as subjects within a network of knowledge relations (Smart 57).  
Stone’s critique and Smart’s response underpins the importance of understanding 
Foucault’s work on confinement not just as the birth of particular kinds of confinement, 
but rather the reifying relationship between human beings and confinement.  Foucault’s 
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work explains the way in which human beings, through institutions such as madhouses, 
wittingly or otherwise, create confinement and the way in which confinement shapes 
human beings capable of facilitating more confinement. 
Ultimately madness became second order to confinement and as confinement 
finally shifted the meaning of madness into one of many functions of confinement, 
confinement moved into society.  Technologies of confinement began to permeate 
through society as a science of confinement, transforming institutions and cultures into 
perpetual sites of confinement.  Once in motion through society, confinement 
transformed intuitions and cultures into sites producing individuals predisposed to 
confinement.  Confinement produced individuals more able to accept a life marked by 
confinement and who would engage in their own exclusion. 
 
2.  Inventing Man 
 
Foucault’s exposition of knowledge production makes clear the process by which 
a society opened up to confinement creates individuals able to understand confinement, a 
society where continual segregation marks an individual as mad or non-mad, criminal or 
non-criminal, and so forth.  Knowledge production describes the production of truth 
whereby a science of segregation produces subjects more acclimated to confinement.  
Foucault finds that truth production turns individuation of the self into a totality of 
normalization.  As an individual attempts to define his or her self in a society marked by 
confinement, the individual must choose from the preexisting options already available in 
society, regulating the way he or she self-defines.  Truth production causes an individual 
to limit his or her understanding of self to socially acceptable parameters.  As knowledge 
production shapes individuals to be able to understand particular types of knowledge, 
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individuals exposed to knowledge production self-define in relation to the knowledge 
they understand.  Through knowledge production, the science of confinement produces 
individuals that self-define within the parameters of confinement and therefore produces 
individuals that participate in their own confinement. 
In an interview Foucault explains the history of knowledge in relation to madness, 
showing that in the Western world madness became a central focus of analysis only in the 
eighteenth century.  Before then the history shows only a few chapters in medical 
treatises dealing with “maladies of the mind” (Foucault, “Interview with Foucault” 254).  
Foucault argues that just as the object of madness began to form so too did a subject able 
to understand madness.  As madhouses insulated madness in the insane, criminality in 
criminals, and so forth the insane person came to view his place in the world through the 
lenses of madness and so began to self-define as a madman.  Self-defining as insane, the 
madman now understands the inverted truth that the confinement of the madhouse is an 
appropriate response to his madness. 
The historical account of the production of the concept of madness lies, for 
Foucault, at the heart of a pervasive historical process known as the birth of the 
normalizing society.  Foucault writes of Western culture, “What they did was to organize 
an experience of the truth of madness linked to the possibility of an effective knowledge 
and the shaping of a subject that knowledge could be known by and know” (History of 
Madness 255).  The production of particular scientific truths through the production of 
knowledge constitutes the normalization or abnormalization of particular populations in 
modern society.  Foucault makes visible the production of particular subjects able to 
rationalize constructed concepts and recognize when certain modes of abnormality occur.  
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The production of knowledge produces subjects who recognize patterns of behavior as 
normal or abnormal.  Knowledge production defines for the human subject what is 
normal. 
Foucault writes that he owes his methodological approach toward knowledge 
production to Nietzsche, whose work offers the most meaningful and effective models of 
knowledge (“Truth and Juridical” 6).  In Nietzsche, Foucault finds a discourse which 
works out an analysis of the formation of the subject, an analysis of the creation of 
certain types of knowledge without granting the pre-existence of a subject of knowledge.  
Foucault begins tracing Nietzsche’s work on the formation of the subject of knowledge 
through Nietzsche’s insistence that “In some remote corner of the universe, bathed in the 
fires of innumerable solar systems, there once was a planet where clever animals invented 
knowledge.  That was the grandest and most mendacious minute of universal history” (6).  
Nietzsche’s use of the word “invention” draws supreme importance for Foucault for it 
means that at a particular point and at a particular place animals invented knowledge 
(Foucault, “Truth and Juridical” 6).  The word “invention” reoccurs often in Nietzsche’s 
work and always with a polemical meaning.  Foucault understands Nietzsche’s use of the 
word “invention” with the word “origin” in mind.  Nietzsche uses them as opposites, as 
the word origin signifies that the appearance of a particular type of knowledge was a 
given (Foucault, “Truth and Juridical” 6-7).  Nietzsche uses invention in terms of 
contrived, in other words manufactured.  Nietzsche uses origin to describe an implicit and 
embedded process that requires no manufacturing.  Invention indicates that the 
appearance of a science of confinement as a particular type of knowledge arises not out 
of an implicit process embedded in the human animal but rather out of a systematically, 
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indeed scientifically, manufactured process.  Confinement arose in the asylum not as an 
embedded aspect of the human animal but rather as a meticulously constructed scheme 
designed by the asylum operators. 
In The Genealogy of Morals Nietzsche writes about a great factory of knowledge 
production (Foucault, “Truth and Juridical” 7).  Knowledge on Nietzsche’s account has 
no origin. Rather knowledge occurs as an invention, manufactured through a series of 
mechanisms.  Knowledge is not implicit in human nature and so not implicit in human 
instinct.  Indeed knowledge occurs when the human instincts systematically give in to 
one another, clashing, compromising, and giving up on their essential natures.  Human 
knowledge, then, begins with giving up of human instinct.  Discarding human instinct 
indicates for Nietzsche not a refinement of humanity but a weakness (Foucault, “Truth 
and Juridical” 8).  In terms of a science of confinement, knowledge operates above the 
human instincts and intuitive productions.  Confinement, understood not only as 
restriction but as restriction in motion, functions in the individual as a weakening of 
human instinct. 
 If knowledge and therefore knowledge of confinement forms no part of human 
nature, then it “is counterinstinctive; just as it is not natural, but counternatural” (Foucault, 
“Truth and Juridical” 8).  Foucault points out that not only can one not find knowledge in 
human nature but also one cannot find any close connection whatsoever between 
knowledge and the knowable world.  The science of confinement emerges in the world 
not as a natural state but as an invented one.  “According to Nietzsche,” Foucault writes, 
“there is no resemblance, no prior affinity between knowledge and the things that need to 
be known” (“Truth and Juridical” 8).  What we tend to conceive of as knowledge is not 
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based on the natural world, rather the world that we typically perceive is based on our 
understanding of knowledge.  Knowledge occurs as a scheme for curbing human instinct 
and the human experience of the world.  With human instinct curbed our sight of the 
world is blurry and so we use the lens of knowledge to clarify the image.  As in the 
madhouse, the cure produces the symptoms.  Knowledge, especially understood in terms 
of the science of confinement, alienates human beings from life.  The production of 
knowledge restricts human interaction with life and closes off the human ability to live.   
On Nietzsche’s account, knowledge and human intuition are as different from one 
another as knowledge and life.  Foucault writes, “So one has a human nature, a world, 
and something called knowledge between the two, without any affinity, resemblance, or 
even natural tie between them” (“Truth and Juridical” 9). The implication of this view is 
that the world is chaos, that is, not really subject to human knowing. Nietzsche argues 
that the totality of the character of the world rests with chaos for all eternity, a lack of 
order and form of the kind we assume in “laws of nature.”  Indeed, Foucault writes that 
we should guard against saying that one finds laws in nature, for such laws cannot exist 
(“Truth and Juridical” 9).  A natural world produces amorphous humans, not humans 
restricted and controlled by systems of confinement.  The science of confinement, as an 
institutional outgrowth of asylum practices, invented the modern world and in trying to 
order it served to confine human possibility.  Halit Mustafa Tagma writes that, on 
Foucault’s account, the modern world emerges as a multiplication of scale and scope of 
the technologies centered upon the body (415).  Tagma characterizes the modern world as 
the location of the transfer of disciplinary technologies once localized to specific spaces 
to a macro level operating globally (415). 
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Knowledge therefore struggles against an open world, a world without order and 
without form, a world without law.  One cannot say that the nature that is “known” 
occurs naturally.  The hostile relationship between the instincts and knowledge marks not 
a continuance of an individual’s humanity but rather a struggle defined by servitude 
(Foucault 9).  A person gives in to servitude as the production of knowledge dominates 
his or her instincts.  Knowledge rearranges nature to conform to the limits of a contrived 
understanding.  Knowledge indicates not just a misidentification of the world but an 
active domination in opposition to the world.  As the production of knowledge covers up 
an individual’s instincts, it sets the individual in opposition to the natural world. 
 Through the invention of knowledge people develop new categories of self 
confinement.  Foucault notes, “This form of power that applies itself to immediate 
everyday life categorizes the individual, marks him by his own individuality, attaches 
him to his own identity, imposes a law of truth on him that he must recognize and others 
have to recognize in him” (“Subject and Power” 331).  The science of confinement uses 
the individual’s self-understanding as a way to mark the individual with certain 
normalized definitions and in turn categorizes and controls the individual.  The individual 
takes on a category through the singularity of his or her understanding of self.  But the 
categorization of individuality gives rise to particular individuals marked by normalized 
identities.  The act of individuation through self-segregation, of defining oneself in terms 
of particular characteristics separate from other characteristics, subjects the individual to 
the mechanisms of exploitation and domination (“Subject and Power” 332).  Foucault 
refers to the act of individuation through self-separation as a combination found in the 
political structures, the mechanisms of power relations that produce certain modes of 
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knowledge, and of “individualization techniques and of totalization procedures” 
(“Subject and Power” 332).  Lorna A. Rhodes writes that institutions position within 
subjects self-repeating concepts of identity (73).  This process proceeds at multiple levels 
and entails continuous positioning and development (Rhodes 73).  The science of 
confinement uses the act of self identification as a means to subjugate the individual, 
forcing the individual to embody the very apparatuses that create and manufacture 
knowledge.  Once normalized by this fluid, ever present and ever evolving form of 
confinement, the individual works at normalizing the world.  The normalized person 
transforms the unbound objects in his or her life, including his or her relationships, his or 
her career, his or her belief structure, into defined, segregated, and categorized objects.   
Foucault demonstrates how the state uses the science of confinement, the 
institutional technologies of confinement born of the asylum, to transform thought 
patterns and alter how an individual interacts with his or her environment in “The 
Political Technology of Individuals.”  Foucault writes that even when we kill or get killed, 
even when we make war or when we seek support as the unemployed, and even when we 
vote for or against governments that cut social security while increasing the defense 
budget we constitute thinking beings engaging in a particular kind of historical rationality 
(“Political Technology” 405).  Foucault refers here to a particular type of rationality that 
comprises one of the main features of modern political rationality, where games of life 
and death play out.  Foucault refers to the “reason of state,” to the motivating logic 
employed by the state which perpetuates the state’s existence by managing the way that 
people interact with the state (“Political Technology” 405).  The reason of state involves 
state actors employing the science of confinement as a means to induce in subjects a 
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perpetual confinement in motion, whereby people observe and move in the modern world 
only within the context of the state. 
One of Foucault’s definitions of the reason of state suggests that it is “A perfect 
knowledge of the means through which states form, strengthen themselves, endure and 
grow” (“Political Technology” 406).  “A perfect knowledge” indicates the production of 
a particular knowledge (“Political Technology” 406).  More so, such a knowledge 
production serves the perpetuation of the state through pure exclusion.  The knowledge of 
confinement invents subjects who in their individuality play at inclusion and, while 
engaging in that play, perpetuate the systems of exclusion that define them.  In other 
words, modes of knowledge production create subjects capable not only of noticing 
abnormality but also of conforming to certain state standards of normality which in turn 
serve to perpetuate the state.  Paul Hirst notes however that knowledge relations have no 
central point of concentration and that knowledge relations work through whole social 
bodies in complex networks, networks not always dependent on the state (56).  
Knowledge relations constituting the science of confinement embody not only state 
repression but a more fundamentally pervasive and widespread confinement.  The science 
of confinement embodies a pervasive confinement stretching past the boundaries of the 
state. 
 
3.  Rise of the World War Machine 
Just as Foucault traces the movement of confinement and the ways knowledge 
production in the context of confinement produces subjects attuned to confinement, 
Deleuze and Guattari lay bare how the science of confinement given over to the reason of 
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the state, embodied in what they refer to as the royal science, produces a global system of 
war and confinement.  States, institutions, and subjects operate to further the aims of 
what Deleuze and Guattari refer to as the World War Machine, a global war machine 
encompassing the totality of the world’s state apparatuses.  The World War Machine 
takes as its aim the confinement in motion of all life and it does so by categorizing and 
labeling all things.  Deleuze and Guattari analyze the rise of the World War Machine as a 
product of what they call a “nomad war machine,” a war machine attached to nomadic 
groups, coming into contact with the state and becoming integrated into the state 
apparatus through the royal science.  As the state merges with the nomad war machine, a 
global war machine emerges.  For example, the Roman Empire reified its global war 
machine by resettling warrior nomads from their traditional lands to defend other regions 
in the empire (Bachrach 484). Arnold Toynbee explains the rise of the Ottoman Empire 
as a band of Eurasian nomads bringing nomadism to bear with Islamic professional 
institutions (120).   
Through what Deleuze and Guattari call “the royal science,” the global war 
machine takes on the aim of world order, of classifying and controlling the entire world.  
Understood generally, the royal science is an authoritarian system of knowledge 
production.  The royal science places its subjects into various ordered schemes and places 
those schemes in opposition to one another by assigning certain values to each.  Deleuze 
and Guattari explain the oppositional formulae of the royal science in terms of the social 
division between intellectual and manual labor (Holland 24).  Royal science devised a 
new category of laborer to describe those once referred to as artisans.  The artisan no 
longer invests talent to engage in creation; rather, the laborer reproduces plans previously 
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formulated by an intellectual manager.  Royal science strips the artisan of autonomy and 
prestige while empowering the technocratic manager (Holland 24).  The royal science 
labels one group better than the other group and assigns those groups an identity based on 
those observations.  The product of the state and its royal science taking up the nomad 
war machine and transforming into a global force working toward world order is what 
Deleuze and Guattari refer to as the World War Machine.   
The royal science takes what it can classify and outlaws the rest.  In order to 
achieve this, royal science employs a striation of formerly smooth space to segregate 
what it means to control and outlaw what it cannot bring into conformity.  In order to 
demonstrate the different spaces occupied by the nomad and by the state apparatus and 
the World War Machine that follows, Deleuze and Guattari distinguish smooth space 
from striated space.  Smooth space is space open to possibility and free from regulation 
(Maskit 472.)  Smooth space occurs without numerical tabulation, without category, and 
without control.  In smooth space the environment and its spatial markers constantly 
change.   In smooth space there are no limits and no borders of segregation.  No distinct 
lines of demarcation separate the sky from the earth, the earth from its trees, and so forth.  
The nomad resides in smooth space and in smooth space the nomad embodies a mode of 
living understood in terms of ever-shifting motion (Deleuze and Guattari, “Treatise on 
Nomadology” 281).  Alternatively, striated space occurs in the world alongside 
categorization, segregation, and confinement.  Striated space engages in the separation of 
individuals occupying it and designates the segregated individuals into defined groups.  
The state occupies striated space with the regularity of enclosure and the normality of 
separation.  Just as the royal science stripped the artisan of creativity to empower the 
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technocratic manager, royal science perpetuates striated space as a means of conforming 
the creativity of the nomad to empower the state.  When the royal science confronts the 
nomad, the royal science imposes mechanisms of control over the nomad, taking from the 
nomad what it can adopt to the state’s purposes.  What the royal science cannot take from 
the nomad and give over to the state apparatus it invalidates or bans outright. 
As the state confronts the nomad, the state provokes in the nomad a defense of its 
movement and the nomad evolves into a war machine for “[The nomad] brings a furor to 
bear against sovereignty, a celerity against gravity…a power against sovereignty, a 
machine against the apparatus” (Deleuze and Guattari, “Treatise on Nomadology” 279).  
The nomadic war machine is subtly distinct from the state in that the former does not 
hold opposition as its purpose or uniting front.  For example, Deleuze and Guattari 
observe that for the nomad there occurs no sharp duality between man and woman, man 
and beast as one finds in the state (“Treatise on Nomadology” 279).  As the nomad 
occupies smooth space, and so does not segregate his or her surroundings, the nomad 
only evolves into a war machine when confronted by the necessity to do so.  The nomad 
evolves into a war machine only when confronted by the striated space of the state. 
From its striated space the state apparatus condemns the nomad.  To the state, the 
nomad’s creativity, boldness, and seemingly esoteric method of moving about in the 
world appear as imbecility and a kind of grotesque derangement.  To the state, the nomad 
embodies madness in dire and immediate need of confinement and parceling.  Deleuze 
and Guattari cite how both capitalist and communist historians viewed Genghis Khan as 
feeble-minded in his understanding of the city.  These historians lack an understanding 
that the nomad’s existence necessitates their being exterior to the state.  In so much as the 
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state occupies striated space, the state begins attempting to define and control the nomad 
the moment the state confronts smooth space.  The nomad’s exteriority to the state, like 
madness’ exteriority to moral order, does not indicate imbecility or derangement, rather 
those labels signal the royal science’s inability to understand it.  It is difficult for royal 
science and its experts to conceptualize the existence of a space outside of the state and 
so, for the experts of royal science, the nomad represents something entirely backwards. 
Deleuze and Guattari argue that understanding the nomad as an inverse of the state is an 
error however, for the nomad war machine “[is] of another species, of another nature, of 
another origin” (“Treatise on Nomadology” 280).  Even within the apparatus of the state 
there occur individuals, found out on the fringes, who embody the nomad war machine.  
The nomad exists anywhere at any time; he or she exists in smooth space. 
The nomad’s illegitimacy within the royal science places the nomad in a condition 
of war with the state.  Where the state presses up against smooth space, the state jostles 
smooth space into striation and then the nomad bands begin to beat their drums (Deleuze 
and Guattari, “Treatise on Nomadology” 290).  In the state’s war with the nomad, the 
state apparatus plunders from the nomad what it can categorize, define, and make use of.  
The state apparatus takes the nomad’s war machine for its own and deploys the war 
machine to accomplish order through war.  It drives its aim of total subjugation and total 
war until it reaches its apex, until it reaches the point where even the state apparatus is 
subordinate to the functions of the war machine (Deleuze and Guattari, “Treatise on 
Nomadology” 291). 
As the state loses its hold of the war machine and the two merge, a World War 
Machine rises as the dominant political order in the world.  The World War Machine’s 
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objective is no longer the state’s objective of the decimation of another state or another 
regime.  Rather, the World War Machine’s objective manifests as a drive toward world 
order through the destruction of the Unspecified Enemy.  Here the World War Machine 
instills “a peace more terrifying than fascist death” (Deleuze and Guattari, “Treatise on 
Nomadology” 291).  The World War Machine imposes world order through the creation 
of wars within itself as it sets its gaze upon the Unspecified Enemy.  Deleuze and 
Guattari write: 
Doubtless, the present situation is highly discouraging. We have watched 
the war machine grow stronger and stronger, as in a science fiction story; 
we have  seen it assign as its objective a  peace still more terrifying than 
fascist death; we have seen it maintain or  instigate the most terrible of  
local wars as parts of itself; we have seen it set its sights on a new type of 
enemy, no longer  another State, or even another regime, but the 
“unspecified enemy”; we have seen it put its counterguerrilla elements 
into place, so that it can be caught by surprise once, but not twice. 
(Thousand Plateaus 422) 
 
The war machine embodies two opposed characteristics.  The nomad uses the war 
machine only when the nomad’s habitation in smooth space is confronted by the state.  
The state then redirects the war machine to instill order and by doing so merges with the 
war machine and transforms into the World War Machine.  The World War Machine 
attempts to enact its control “to the limits of the universe” (Deleuze and Guattari, 
Thousand Plateaus 291).  The World War Machine counts as its enemy par excellence, 
the unknown and untabulated.  What the World War Machine cannot immediately bring 
under its gaze it makes war on, often creating war within itself as a means to finding the 
unknown saboteur and at other times making war within itself as a way of attempting to 
prevent the spontaneous manifestation of the saboteur (Deleuze and Guattari, Thousand 
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Plateaus 422).  Internally or externally, the World War Machine makes war on 
omnipresent possibility. 
Judith Butler’s description of the sending of ordnance as a political ordinance to 
obey demonstrates one way the World War Machine instills order through war.  Butler 
analyzes a phrase mentioned by Colin Powell, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, wherein he described the bombing of a people as the “delivery of an ordinance” 
(395).  Here the act of war appears inseparable from the administration of authority.  
Feminist scholar Jodi Dean writes that Butler makes explicit the link between the 
juridical notion of ordinance and the militaristic sending of missiles as the delivery of an 
ordinance.  By making the link explicit, Butler demonstrates how the threat of death 
accompanies the demand for obedience (Dean 149).  The World War Machine obtains 
order though horrendous acts of violence and destruction.  Butler notes that the missiles 
used in such bombings, the “ordinances,” take on the role of commands. The missiles 
transform into orders to obey (Butler 395).  When the World War Machine sends an order 
to obey it does so alongside an ascription to death while proclaiming order through war.  
“Of course,” Butler writes, “this is a message that can never be received, for it kills its 
addressee, and so it is not an ordinance at all, but the failure of all ordinances, the refusal 
of a communication” (395).  Butler’s example demonstrates the intimate connection 
between order and death, between order and war.  The World War Machine deploys war 
as a means of instilling order. 
In response to one of the World War Machine’s local wars, a newscaster called 
the weapons being used by the United States “instruments of terrible beauty” (Butler 394).  
He continued on in sanguinary bliss to revel in the instruments’ homicidal abilities.  As 
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the newscaster praises domination the newscaster occupies striated space and so striation 
blurs his thinking.  At the moment the newscaster publicly fantasized about the havoc 
wrought through war, the newscaster’s thoughts turned into action and comprised active 
participation in war (Butler 395).  As the asylum produced individuals better able to 
understand confinement, the World War Machine produces individuals better able to 
understand order through perpetual war.  Where an individual comes to understand the 
logic of order through perpetual war, the World War Machine has covered up instinct, 
introducing in place of instinct the knowledge of order through war. 
As the technologies of confinement employed by the asylum take on new roles in 
new institutions, the confinement of the asylum comes to establish in societies a science 
of confinement.  Understanding knowledge production in terms of the asylum, Foucault 
makes clear the process by which the state produces individuals more apt to understand 
and accept confinement.  The science of confinement, adopted by the state, emerges as 
the royal science, the science of definition, segregation, and control.  As the royal science 
adapts the war machine of the nomad for use by the state, the state and war machine 
merge into a World War Machine, a global collection of state war machines aimed at 
creating world order through war.  In the striated space of the royal science everything 
has its place and the boundaries of striation categorize the subject.  If a person crosses the 
boundaries of striated space, that person embodies the Unspecified Enemy, threatening 
the identity of the subject that the World War Machine so meticulously delineated.  Only 
with strict boundaries in place can the World War Machine sustain the metamorphosis of 
the subject into a subject whose instincts have been covered up by the knowledge of 
confinement, a subject able to understand order through war, a subject who ultimately 
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perpetuates the existence of the World War Machine through a willingness to submit to 
the World War Machine’s control.
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Chapter Two 
 
War, Internment, and Panopticon 
 
The World War Machine, a set of tendencies of state war machines to collectivize 
into global instruments of control, encompasses the governing order of the world.  The 
World War Machine redirects the resources of individual states toward maintaining 
effective means of subduing potentially unknown enemies, enemies the World War 
Machine has yet to catalogue and regulate.  The World War Machine utilizes the creation 
and/or sustainment of wars between and within states to further the aim of maintaining 
world order, a world where all things exist as known, categorized, and controlled.  The 
World War Machine also creates wars within itself.  States use war as a means to shape 
their collectivization within the World War Machine.  Where the World War Machine 
works at the creation and/or sustainment of war, centralized structures of confinement 
emerge in the form of internment camps.  By designating various groups within 
populations as enemies and interning them, the World War Machine creates visible 
mechanisms for subduing the Unspecified Enemy, most often the individual not yet 
controlled by the World War Machine. 
The World War Machine’s act of interning local populations reveals a network of 
a hidden internment already operating throughout a given population.  Agamben calls this 
network the hidden matrix of internment.  Visible internment camps buttress a hidden 
internment already taking place within a given population as a pre-existing symptom of 
the World War Machine’s aim of maintaining world order.  By creating visible forms of 
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internment through the placement of local populations in internment camps, the World 
War Machine creates a mechanism designed to provide a means for interning any 
unknown enemies, anyone not already confined by hidden means of confinement.  For 
those interned, life resembles a kind of waking death whereby they see the world around 
them and remain unable to participate in it. 
Surveillance constitutes the primary driving mechanism of hidden internment.  A 
look at the way in which populations come under the scrutiny of surveillance brings forth 
an understanding of the means by which the World War Machine creates and maintains 
hidden internment throughout populations.  By interning populations through surveillance 
the World War Machine normalizes individuals into acting in knowable and predictable 
ways.  Interned populations become “self-regulating,” doing the work of surveillance on 
themselves.  Foucault refers to the institutionalization of surveillance and normalization 
as the panopticon. Originally conceived by the political theorist Jeremy Bentham as a 
fungible model for prisons, schools, and workhouses, the panopticon normalizes the ways 
that individuals live in the world through defining pre-approved methods of conduct.  In 
seeking to fulfill its aim of world order the World War Machine produces hidden 
internment in populations by using the panopticon to bring under surveillance and 
normalize virtually all human existence. 
 
1. Internment Camps and the World War Machine 
Three examples of internment camps demonstrate that where the World War 
Machine creates and sustains wars internment camps emerge:  Japanese-American 
internment during The Second World War, Irish internment at the height of the IRA 
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conflict, and American internment of civilian protestors during the Second Gulf War.  In 
each instance where the World War Machine makes war within itself, either between 
states or within a state, internment camps exist in visible operation as a means of 
instituting total order, order not in part but in whole.  In each instance the states involved 
in maintaining internment knew the populations interned posed no threat to world order. 
The states designated these populations as enemies as a means to produce augmented 
internment ready for use against the potential unknown enemies of the World War 
Machine.  The examples by no means exhaust the literature on war and internment, a 
literature increasingly developing into an emerging field of study called the archeology of 
internment; rather the examples give clear accounts of a few cases out of many where the 
World War Machine has created internment camps while creating and sustaining wars 
within itself. 
After the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941 and America’s 
subsequent entrance into World War II, President Franklin Roosevelt issued Executive 
Order 9066 (National Archives).  Executive Order 9066 permitted the American military 
to circumvent constitutional safeguards historically protecting American citizens.  
President Roosevelt justified the order by citing the need for an increase in national 
security.  The order spurred into motion the mass internment of 120,000 persons of 
Japanese ancestry living on the West Coast of the United States (Ina).  Most of those 
placed in the internment camps had already obtained either U.S. citizenship or permanent 
resident status.  In this instance, the World War Machine challenges state authority as it 
uses the state apparatus to intern its own citizens.  In causing the state apparatus to intern 
its own citizens the World War Machine turns the state in on itself and subverts the 
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state’s authority.  Japanese-Americans experienced internment for up to four years in 
remote concentration camps surrounded by barbed wire, without any recourse in 
American law (Ina).  In many instances the policy of internment broke up families and 
sent them to different camps, camps that President Roosevelt himself described as 
concentration camps.  Many Japanese-Americans died in the camps from a lack of 
medical care. Many others died at the hands of guards for resisting orders (Ina).  
While the United States Supreme Court in Korematsu v. United States justified 
Executive Order 9066 as a necessary military order to prevent espionage and sabotage, 
authorities had no clear and direct evidence that Japanese Americans posed, as a group or 
by generalization of their heritage, an imminent threat to either the United States directly 
or to the war effort as a whole.  Attorney General Biddle spoke out against the planning 
of the mass evacuations and internment in a letter he wrote to President Roosevelt, where 
he noted that the War Department, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Navy 
Department, and the Justice Department expected no attacks from Japanese-Americans 
living on the West Coast and that no evidence existed of widespread sabotage  (Daniels 
49).   
Including the Attorney General’s office, five departments within the United States 
Federal Government agreed that Japanese Americans posed no threat and yet the 
Roosevelt administration still interned Japanese Americans.  Through the logic of the 
World War Machine, Roosevelt subverted the state apparatus on the American West 
Coast and in place of the state apparatus initiated internment camps as a means of 
instituting total order.  The Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of 
Civilians at the behest of the United States Congress investigated the causes for the rise 
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of mass internment in the United States as a result of Executive Order 9066.  In 1983 the 
commission concluded that “racial prejudices, wartime hysteria, and a failure of political 
leadership” motivated internment, not a legitimate national defense program (Ina).  The 
failure of political leadership during the rise of internment camps in the United States 
brings to light the ability of the World War Machine to subvert the state and underscores 
the hierarchical relationship between the World War Machine and the state.  As states 
merge with war machines and reorganize themselves into the World War Machine each 
individual state becomes subservient to the World War Machine.  As states become 
subservient to the World War Machine, individuals are no longer governed entirely by 
the political leadership of the state.  Individuals are governed by the World War 
Machine’s edict of order through war.  Although five departments within the Federal 
Government opposed internment camps, the World War Machine created internment 
camps.  The World War Machine recognizes the state only as a useful object in its aim of 
world order. 
Nearly fifty years after Executive Order 9066, the passage of the Civil Liberties 
Act of 1988 acknowledged the grave injustice done to Japanese-Americans and included 
reparations for the victims of internment camps.  The President of the United States sent 
reparations with an apology letter (Ina).  On the surface, internment camps appear 
somewhat isolated, existing for most states as actions out of character which the states 
later deeply regretted.  Internment however comprises the modus operandi of the World 
War Machine, which states operate as both subjects to and a part of. 
The World War Machine enacted internment camps again in 1972, this time in 
Northern Ireland in that state’s war with the paramilitary Irish Republican Army (IRA).  
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Wars within the World War Machine do not always occur between separate states, but 
often occur within the boundaries of a particular state or group of states.  Northern 
Ireland in 1972 saw the passage of the Detention of Terrorists Order which stated that the 
Secretary of State could order internment of suspected terrorists.  The interned lost access 
to their judicial hearings, had evidence normally excluded from courts used against them, 
and faced anonymous witnesses.  Northern Ireland initially arrested 342 people, mostly 
retired Republicans, unionists, people campaigning for civil rights, a drunk picked up 
from a bus stop, and many held as a result of mistaken identity (Gormally, McEvoy, and 
Wall 71).  Northern Ireland also mistakenly placed several names of dead people on the 
arrest lists.  Over the next several months Northern Ireland placed over two thousand 
more “suspected terrorists” in internment camps (Gormally, McEvoy, and Wall 71). Most 
of the people interned were either entirely innocent or barely on the margins of political 
violence (Gormally, McEvoy, and Wall 71-72).   
The case of Northern Ireland demonstrates the degree to which the Unspecified 
Enemy embodies the enemy of the World War Machine.  The state and non-state 
combatants that the World War Machine already knows and regulates are not its enemies.  
Known state and non-state combatants, no matter how numerous or how seemingly at 
odds with one another, remain members of the same world order of the World War 
Machine.  In this case, members of actual IRA groups and Northern Ireland fought 
against one another as known combatants, yet retired Republicans, unionists, drunkards, 
and others not active within the IRA largely filled the internment camps.  Those interned 
in Northern Ireland did not actually engage in terrorism, rather Northern Ireland interned 
on the basis of designating certain groups as terrorists.  In the seven months before 
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internment, eleven soldiers and seventeen civilians died.  In the five months after 
internment began thirty seven soldiers and ninety seven civilians died as a result of 
violence (Gormally, McEvoy, and Wall 72).  When the former secretary of state of 
Northern Ireland, the man who oversaw internment operations in Northern Ireland, was 
asked about the policy of internment, he said, “Now if you say that I put some in [the 
camps] who shouldn’t have been in, yes I would think that is certainly right…I have the 
greatest doubts looking back whether internment was ever right” (Gormally, McEvoy, 
and Wall 72-73).  Internment ended in Northern Ireland after the Gardiner Report of 1975 
criticized internment as having brought the law into contempt (Gormally, McEvoy, and 
Wall 74).  The Gardiner Report of 1975 therefore explicitly implied that internment 
occurred as both antithetical and alien to the state apparatus.  The Gardiner Report of 
1975 reveals internment as a function not of the state apparatus, but rather as a function 
of the World War Machine.  For four years the World War Machine visibly subverted 
Northern Ireland’s state apparatus.   
Internment manifesting in visible ways lays bare the state apparatus’s relationship 
to the World War Machine as an object to be used by and subject to it.  The World War 
Machine, through internment, creates visible spaces of control not only over the 
individuals interned but also over the state as the state and its various apparatuses remain 
impotent against the formation of visible spaces of internment.  One such instance of 
visible internment occurred in 2004 in New York City.  In late August and early 
September in 2004 hundreds of thousands of American protesters marched and 
demonstrated in New York City as a response to the Republican National Convention and 
its support of the United States’ participation in the Second Gulf War (CNN).  According 
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to the Aids Coalition to Unleash Power (ACT UP), a major protest group participating in 
the 2004 New York City protests, much of the protest targeted the illegal wars engaged in 
by the Bush administration (ACT UP).  In an explanation of some of their demonstration 
activities they wrote, “[Our] action was conceived as a peaceful visual message of protest 
against the Bush administration…and the wars it has engendered…he has launched wars 
that have added to the violence and incited terrorists.” (ACT UP)  The emergence of 
visible locations of internment alongside the anti-war movement demonstrates the logic 
of the World War Machine.  Resistance to order through war represents a kind of 
madness in dire need of internment qua World War Machine.  During this period, police 
officers arrested protestors, observers, and by-standers, with most arrests occurring 
without any intent of actual prosecution (ACT UP).  By removing the intention of 
prosecution as a reason for arrest the World War Machine subverted the state and its legal 
apparatuses.  The World War Machine used the state as a means to facilitate arrest and 
internment, all the while subverting the state.  Simon Glezos writes in The Politics of 
Speed: Capitalism, the State and War in an Accelerating World that the World War 
Machine insinuates into all elements of the political assemblage the practice of war (68).  
The World War Machine transitions state mechanisms such as police into extensions of 
the war apparatus (Glezos 68). 
 Over one thousand protesters in 2004 in New York City at the Republican 
National Convention protest ended up interned at Pier 57, an old bus depot the NYPD 
converted into a holding facility (NYCLU).  Some protestors, like Matt Daloisio, got 
arrested even after negotiating demonstration parameters with the police 
(democracynow.org).  The World War Machine subverted the state apparatus as it 
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interned even those who negotiated protest locations with the state.  Daloisio and others 
marched around Ground Zero as an act of remembrance for those who died as a result of 
the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.  Matt Daloisio described internment at pier 57 as “a 
sort of rough scene.  There was oil on the floor.  There were large pens.  By the time we 
got there…the pens started to fill up” (democracynow.org).  He went on to describe to the 
media organization Democracy Now! how many people, because of overcrowding, had 
no where else to sit but on an area of the floor covered in old oil residue and the chemical 
burns that people suffered as a result (democracynow.org).  Signs in the old garage turned 
razor wire-ridden internment facility stated that the building had hazardous materials 
inside (Brasch 107).  
 Arrest and eventual internment at Pier 57 of Matt Daloisio and others occurred 
despite their being joined by a delegate from the Republican National Convention 
(democracynow.org).  The arrest of a delegate from the Republican National Convention 
reveals an important feature of the World War Machine.  Although the Republican 
National Convention supported the wars taking place in and around the Middle East, the 
World War Machine interned one of its delegates. The World War Machine sees the state 
apparatus and its participants as objects to use toward certain goals and little else.  The 
arrest and internment of a Republican delegate demonstrated that although the state or 
groups within the state may or may not willingly participate within the World War 
Machine, the state and groups within it operate subject to the World War Machine.  The 
World War Machine does not answer to the state or groups within the state; it uses them 
for its own purposes. 
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 Deleuze and Guattari’s understanding of the role of state police attests to the 
subordinate relationship of the state to the World War Machine.  The state police force 
seizes individuals immediately in response to alleged crime (Deleuze and Guattari, 
Thousand Plateaus 352).  During the pier 57 debacle the seizure and internment of 
individuals came about as the result of planned internment, not immediate seizure in 
response to crime.  The World War Machine acts and plans deliberately.  Internment 
therefore operated not as a function of policing, rather as a planned and directed act of the 
World War Machine.  A document titled, “Memorandum of Understanding Between The 
Hudson River Park Trust and The New York Police Department” details the leasing of 
Pier 57 to the NYPD as an interment facility.  Section one of the confidential 
memorandum, made public by a New York Freedom of Information law, states in part, 
“The first floor Pier 57 shall be used [as] a secondary arrest processing center and 
temporary holding center for detainees” (NYCLU).  The memorandum goes on to 
describe the modification allowable in the building such as the addition of razor wire and 
other implements used for internment of detainees.  New York City authorities agreed to 
and signed the memorandum a month before internment began (NYCLU).  The 
internment facility’s refusal to either legitimately charge the detainees or release them in 
a timely manner makes visible the impotence of the state apparatus in relation to the 
World War Machine.  The World War Machine often operates outside of the state and its 
legal mechanisms, undermining the authority of the state as it creates spaces of 
internment. 
New York State Supreme Court Judge John Cataldo ordered that the city 
immediately release hundreds of those interned or face a thousand dollar fine per person 
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every day.  The judge gave the city twenty four hours to begin the release of interned 
persons.  Reluctantly, the city did begin to comply with the order to release the interned 
but the city’s response time ran afoul of the immediate time frame of release ordered by 
the judge.  The judge initially fined the city 600,000 dollars for contempt of court for its 
slow response, but city attorneys argued that Judge Cataldo had not given the city enough 
time to comply, even though the Manhattan District Attorney stated that the city could 
handle the release of a thousand detainees a day (Brasch 107-108).  The city willfully 
continued to subvert the Judge’s orders and not as the result of an inability to process the 
detainees fast enough.  Judge Cataldo’s statement that the city’s problematic compliance 
with a judicial order to release the detainees marked both “willful and intentional” 
subversion made the subversion of the state apparatus apparent (Brasch 107-108).  Acting 
as part of the state apparatus, Judge Cataldo’s order for an immediate end to internment 
met willful and intentional disregard from the city’s internment program, a manifestation 
of the World War Machine. 
The examples of the World War Machine being active during World War II, the 
Northern Irish war with the paramilitary IRA, and the Second Gulf War demonstrate 
three similarities which indicate not only the very presence of the World War Machine 
but more specifically its connection to internment.  First, each instance of the World War 
Machine’s activity manifest in the intentional and planned internment of populations.  
During WWII the U.S. interned Japanese-Americans, over half of whom had U.S. 
citizenship and were protected under its constitution and law.  Northern Ireland interned 
nearly three thousand members of their own population during their war with the IRA.  
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During the Second Gulf War the U.S. arrested and interned over one thousand American 
protestors.  
Second, each example also displays some measure of a sheer kind of helplessness 
of the state apparatus in the face of the World War Machine.  A President of the U.S. 
would later apologize for the United States’ role in internment during WWII recognizing 
that the state failed to protect its own citizens and residents from internment.  As the 
Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians reported, war hysteria 
overtook political leadership.  In Northern Ireland the Gardiner Report of 1975 had 
similar findings, stating that the policy of internment of members from the local 
population undermined law within Northern Ireland.  The state does not typically 
willfully subvert its own apparatuses and so the language of Gardiner Report of 1975 
reveals the relationship between the state and internment when the report indicates not 
that the law or North Ireland subverted the state apparatus, but rather that the policy of 
internment subverted the state apparatus.  A State Supreme Court judge in New York 
ordered interment in New York City to end immediately.  Instead of compliance the city 
met the judge’s order with willful disregard.  While each case expresses a tension 
between the state and the World War Machine, the cases indicate that willingly or 
unwillingly the state apparatus serves the World War Machine. 
Finally, in each example of the World War Machine’s movements the populations 
interned remained largely innocent of the crimes, potential or real, for which internment 
occurred.  The World War Machine takes no care to distinguish between innocents and 
real combatants.  The Roosevelt administration had full knowledge of the innocence of 
those it ordered interned.  Northern Ireland largely interned union workers, retirees, and 
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drunkards, a fact its officials later admitted.  Indeed actual violence rose significantly 
during the period of Irish internment, exhibiting the opposite of internment’s stated 
purpose.  New York City refused to prosecute a majority of those it arrested and interned 
as it knew the interned population had committed no crimes.  The World War Machine 
makes war for the sake of world order and within this singular drive one finds bound with 
it the presence of internment meant to root out the Unspecified Enemy.  In doing so the 
World War Machine designates parts of populations as enemies as a means of creating 
the spaces of visible internment necessary for the internment of the Unspecified Enemy, 
the unknown and unclassified enemy. 
 
2.  The Hidden Matrix of Internment 
Where the World War Machine creates no visible spaces of internment within a 
population, the presence of less visible means of internment emerge.  The walls 
surrounding internment camps are erected around a space that embodied internment long 
before its function as a space of internment came to light.  Internment camps emerge in 
populations as augmented forms of internment where hidden forms of internment already 
condition every day life.  In Means Without End, Agamben notes that the internment 
camp constitutes a hidden matrix occupying the political space that individuals live in.  
The hidden matrix of internment permeates virtually all modern life, causing life and 
death to occupy a zone of indistinction, a zone where neither appears without the other 
(Agamben, Homo Sacer 40-41).  Agamben notes the “indifferentiability of 
relationships…between humans and politics” (Ek 365).  Humans live in the world 
inseparable from the politics they engage in.  As modern political community begins to 
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resemble death so too does life, each abolishing one other and entering into a new 
dimension of death (Agamben, Homo Sacer 55).   
Agamben finds within the interment camp a pervasive logic of categorization and 
confinement which operates not only as the driving mechanism behind the visible 
internment camp but also behind the hidden matrix of internment.  Valerio Ferme’s 
“Translating the Babel of Horror” explains the logic of the camp as a logic that 
dehumanizes its prisoners by separating them and transforming them into regulated units 
(58).  The logic of the camp turns the individual into a defined unit segregated from the 
world (Ferme 55).  Institutionalized confinement causes the individual to experience 
alienation from the world.  The logic of the camp permeates alienation through the 
partitioning of confinement in socio-political institutions.  Socio-political theorists Bulent 
Diken and Carsten Lausten observe that the distinctions between inside the camp and 
outside the camp have disappeared such that the logic of the camp permeates throughout 
the entirety of modern society (451).  The logic of the camp promotes an unbonding form 
of socialization so that the individual no longer forms relationships but rather remains 
alone in the world.  The once historical anomaly of internment camps now pervades the 
order of modern political space (Diken and Lausten 451).  The logic of the camp 
exemplifies the pervasive logic born out of what Deleuze and Guattari refer to as the 
royal science, the science of the state apparatus.  Given over to the World War Machine, 
continual exclusion and confinement marks the logic of the camp.  The logic of the camp 
emerges as the driving logic of inveterate internment within the World War Machine. 
As the logic of the camp subsumes the modern political order, Agamben lays bare 
how the logic of the camp binds politics with death.  Agamben provides a sketch of life 
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within the camp in Means Without Ends where he notes the lack of stories told by 
survivors of physical internment camps.  The description Agamben gives of camp life 
overtakes, in often hidden ways, life within the modern political order.  Agamben found 
camp survivors unable to signify any resemblance of life:   
The survivors who came back…from the camps had no stories to tell, and 
that…they did not try to communicate what they had lived through, as if 
they themselves were the first to be seized by doubts regarding the reality 
of what had befallen them, as if they had somehow mistaken a nightmare 
for a real event.  (Means Wihout Ends 121) 
 
The camp survivors knew that in Auschwitz they did not gain wisdom or a more 
profound understanding of life.  They did not develop into more human persons. Rather 
they had come out of the camps stripped naked and hollowed out, resembling individuals 
perpetually experiencing death (Agamben, Means Wihout Ends 121).  In other words, 
survivors had been transformed and moved into a zone characterized by death which was 
not lost once they were “liberated” (Agamben, Means Wihout Ends 122).  One did not 
enter the camp out of political choice but rather as a result of biological criteria turned 
into political criteria.  Political life and biological life appear utterly indistinguishable in 
the camp (Agamben, Means Wihout Ends 122).  To call such a mode of living “life” does 
not convey an accurate description. Such a mode of being occupies a space more 
travelled by death than anything else.   
The internment camp symbolizes the place par excellence where politics and 
death occupy a zone of indistinction.  Operating as a political institution of confinement 
the internment camp localizes death through sanctioned atrocity.  As the logic of the 
camp gives politics over to a zone of death so too does the logic of the camp give 
individual existence, indeed life itself, over to death.  In the internment camp individual 
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beings no longer signify life but rather signify only death.  The camp as confinement par 
excellence stifles the human instinct to live.  Signifying death and being dead differ in 
that at every moment the one who signifies death has to live death over and over again.  
Those who die experience death only once, whereas those who signify death experience a 
perpetual death every second of every moment. 
 All modern political life within the context of the internment camp exists as 
inseparable from death.  In “The Camp as the Nomos of the Modern” Agamben writes 
that the internment camp realizes the most inhuman conditions on earth.  The camp 
comes into view not just as some historic fact or an anomaly of the past, but rather the 
camp pervades through the spaces we occupy every day as we condition ourselves toward 
understanding and accepting confinement.  We enter the camp each time we disregard 
our instincts as madness in favor of a categorized and well ordered mode of being.  The 
essence of the camp consists of the “materialization of the state of exception and in the 
subsequent creation of a space in which bare life and the juridical rule enter into a 
threshold of indistinction” (Agamben, Homo Sacer 174).  The birth of the camp in our 
time signals the political space of modernity, where death and politics merge together.  
As the logic of the camp defines us and separates us from others it places us into an 
internment camp with virtually invisible, yet ever present, walls of delineation.  Agamben 
writes of our perpetual internment, “The camp…is the hidden matrix of the politics in 
which we are still living, and it is the structure of the camp that we must learn to 
recognize in all its metamorphoses” (Homo Sacer 175). 
Agamben’s critique of Karl Binding’s work on suicide demonstrates how the 
logic of the camp opens individuals within the modern political order to annihilation by 
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the camp. Karl Binding and Alfred Hoche’s work Authorization for the Annihilation of 
Life Unworthy of Being Lived proposes the unpunishability of suicide by conceiving of 
suicide as the expression of man’s sovereignty over his own existence (Agamben, Homo 
Sacer 136).  Binding and Hoche relate man’s sovereignty with man’s death.  From the 
sovereignty of man over his own existence Binding and Hoche derive the necessity of 
authorizing the annihilation of life unworthy of living.  The moment individuals no 
longer hold sovereignty over their own selves they enter into a sphere of death open to 
annihilation.  Binding and Hoche pose the question, “Must the unpunishability of the 
killing of life remain limited to suicide…or must it be extended to the killing of third 
parties?” (Agamben, Homo Sacer 137).  Binding and Hoche ask further whether or not 
lives that have lost the quality of political good, lives no longer able to participate in the 
community, should continue at all.  Binding and Hoche write that such men without value 
to themselves or to society have neither the will to live nor the will to die (Agamben, 
Homo Sacer 138).  On the one hand, they do not consent to die and, on the other, their 
killing does not infringe on any will to live.  In Binding and Hoche’s account, such life 
signifies death.  Binding and Hoche see no reason not to authorize the killing of such men 
who serve as an inverted image of authentic humanity.  Binding and Hoche argue that life 
resembling death has no value, indeed such life has negative value, and therefore has no 
right to continue existing.  In so much as the logic of the camp places political life and 
death into a zone of indistinction, a zone where political life and death resemble one 
another, all modern political life resembles death and so opens up to the possibility of 
annihilation that Binding and Hoche authorize for negative life. 
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For Agamben this new category of a life without meaning, of a state of being 
more characterized by death than life, corresponds to a life open to elimination by the 
political order.  He writes that it “is as if every valorization and every politicization of 
life…necessarily implies a new decision concerning the threshold beyond life…and can 
as such be eliminated without punishment” (Homo Sacer 136-139).  The hidden matrix of 
internment has moved through the political order to such a degree that it has moved 
inside every human life (Agamben, Homo Sacer 139-140).  The internment camp “is no 
longer confined to a particular place…It now dwells in the biological body of every 
living being” (Agamben, Homo Sacer 140)  Binding and Hoche write that the ill person is 
free to choose his own time of death when capable or, when not, may have a doctor or 
close relative choose.   The final decision, they argue, should, however, fall to a state 
committee (Agamben, Homo Sacer 139).  The political order should mark the exact 
moment of death for the individual.  Binding and Hoche’s observation takes on an ever 
more sinister metamorphosis as the World War Machine subverts and overtakes the state.  
In their scenario, the World War Machine would retain the ultimate right to end the life 
of individuals within it and so functions as an arbiter of death.  At the very moment that 
the World War Machine becomes the arbiter of death, all modern political existence and 
the individuals within are opened up to the possibility of annihilation. 
Politics marks and occupies a zone of death.  Agamben finds that virtually all 
societies today, to the degree they occur in the context of a political order joined to the 
World War Machine, exist in a continuous state of death.  Agamben writes, “All societies 
and all cultures today have entered into a legitimation crisis in which law…is in form as 
the pure Nothing of Revelation” (Homo Sacer 55).  Law as the pure Nothing of 
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Revelation indicates that in a zone of death, law no longer signifies human community or 
any value at all.  Law in the zone of death acts only in conjunction with and in relation to 
internment.  The hidden matrix of internment generalizes the logic of the camp 
throughout political space.  The logic of the camp produces individuals unable to signify 
any value either to themselves or to the societies in which they live and through stripping 
individuals of their signification of worth causes individuals to resemble death. 
 Camps have reappeared within the modern world in subtle ways, giving urgency 
to Agamben’s call for the ability to recognize the camp when it appears.  When Binding 
and Hoche call for the annihilation of life signifying death they bring a horrifying 
revelation to the foreground: in so far as our relationship to politics binds us to a political 
order that categorizes, defines, and closes us off from life, the political order opens all of 
us up to the possibility of annihilation.  Agamben’s demonstration of the kind of 
existence produced by internment elucidates internment as a hidden matrix of death 
running through the entirety of our modern political order.  The logic of the camplays 
bare the pervasive death that occurs as a symptom of the World War Machine.  The 
World War Machine employs perpetual internment toward its aim of world order, of a 
world where all things remain known, categorized, and controlled.  When the World War 
Machine seizes upon a person and robs his or her ability to move and create, the World 
War Machine carves an image of rigor mortis in that person.  
 
3.  Welcome to the Panopticon 
The internment camp marks not just an historic event but also the logic which 
structures our everyday existence.  The logic of the camp produces a wide-ranging and 
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pervasive alienation of life.  Where the World War Machine creates a visible locus of 
internment it merely constitutes a physical symbol of a more subtle panoptic space whose 
population had long been interred in an Agambenian camp long before the World War 
Machine made internment visible. 
The World War Machine uses the power of continual surveillance, panoptic 
power, to categorize the individual, mark him by his identity, and apply a law of truth to 
him.  Panoptic power turns individuals into subjects who subtly participate in their own 
confinement (Rabinow 130).  Panopticism deals with what Foucault calls “dividing 
practices” (Rabinow 126)  The World War Machine divides individuals from one another 
by applying to each labels of sane or insane, healthy or sick, moral or amoral, and so 
forth.  Recalling Valerio Ferme’s understanding of the logic of the camp as the logic that 
interns individuals by separating them from their ability to self-define and then 
transforms them into regulated units, the panopticon epitomizes the logic of the camp.  
The panopticon generates individuals who participate, like madmen in the asylum, in 
their own internment by perpetuating their own exclusion and categorization. 
Jeremy Bentham, nineteenth-century philosopher, social reformer, and utilitarian, 
designed a model for a prison which aimed to put into practice a self-perpetuating 
internment.  The design utilized a physical institution of internment that over time trained 
the individual’s own perception and self-labelling practices.  Bentham called his design a 
panopticon, or inspection house.  Foucault notes the deeper implications of Bentham’s 
panopticon including the way in which the panopticon exercises power over populations 
whereby power does not always remain visible yet remains ever present.  Bentham’s 
panopticon represents the architectural figure of this process (Foucault, Discipline and 
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Punish 200). The panopticon, or inspection hose, represents a way to obtain power of 
mind over mind (Bentham).  Whether the facility houses the insane, the sick, school 
children, or criminals, Bentham maintains that the more inspection or surveillance placed 
upon a person, the better the facility fulfils its purpose.  Each person needs the constant 
feeling of surveillance looming over them (Bentham).   
Architecturally, Bentham’s inspection house has a circular design in which the 
cells occupy the circumference of the building (Bentham).  The cells are divided from 
one another so as to prohibit the inmates from communicating with one another. It is 
critical, that the panopticon separates individuals from one another.  The inspector’s 
housing occupies the center, separate from the circumference via a vacant space known 
as the “annular” area (Bentham).  To prevent prisoners from viewing the cells of other 
prisoners, Bentham places partitions in the building (Bentham).  Tin tubes run from each 
cell to the tower, as a means to notify the inspector of any communication between the 
inmates.  Even a whisper travels down the tubing to alert the inspector (Bentham). 
The functionality of the building resides in the centrality of the inspector’s 
situation as well as in the effective ways of “seeing without being seen” (Bentham).  The 
building structures the larger purpose. The design causes each prisoner to feel under 
constant surveillance.  The inspector presents himself as often as possible to ensure the 
administration of proper discipline and to ensure that the discipline has the proper effect 
on the prisoner (Bentham).  The panopticon provides a measure of security against 
escapes not seen in any other penitentiary.  Overpowering the guard requires a union of 
minds among the prisoners.  The panopticon’s design of constant separation eradicates 
the possibility of any such union.  None would try to undermine the walls or manipulate 
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the iron bars while under constant surveillance (Bentham).  To the inspector, the 
prisoners represent a multitude, but the prisoners conceive of themselves as solitary 
individuals.  Solitude turns individuals into subjects who, being shut off from the world, 
define themselves without the context of others.  Self-definition occurs, but only as 
controlled and manipulated self-definition so that definition does not come from within 
the self but rather from the panopticon.  While older forms of confinement such as 
dungeons dispensed with total solitude, the panopticon rests upon that very principle. 
On Foucault’s account the panopticon induces a state of permanent visibility in 
the prisoner which “assures the automatic functioning of power” (Foucault, Discipline 
and Punish 201).  The panopticon gains its power not through a particular person, but 
rather through the arrangement of persons.  Because the panopticon relies on placement 
of individuals, any person can exercise power in the panopticon.  Any individual placed 
at the center of a panoptic design works as well as any other (Foucault, Discipline and 
Punish 202).  Power changes hands from the administration of physical means of 
confinement to the impersonal panoptic machine (Foucault, Discipline and Punish 202).  
Panoptic machines often require little or no outside input from controlling managers.  
Whereas asylum operators were once necessary to confine madmen, panoptic machines 
condition subjects to act as both prisoner and guard.   
The panopticon represents not only a machine of control, but also a laboratory 
where experiments take place.  The panopticon alters, trains, and corrects behavior 
(Foucault, Discipline and Punish 203).  The panopticon experiments on men to determine 
the best methods for bringing about their transformations, whether into a model citizen, a 
diligent student, or a more efficient worker (Foucault, Discipline and Punish 204).  From 
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the tower, the inspector may spy on those he or she employs.  The director of the 
establishment judges, at a mere glance from the central tower, the efficiency of the 
establishment.  In addition, the employed inspector has no way to hide his own failings.  
If the establishment contains areas of inefficiency, the director readily knows about it 
(Foucault, Discipline and Punish 204).  The panopticon gives the ability to a director to 
enter into each interned person’s behavior and modify it no matter their apparent position 
(Foucault 204).  Through the use of the panopticon the World War Machine applies 
control over individuals.  Those subjected to the machinery of the panopticon assume 
responsibility of applying the mechanisms of power to themselves (Foucault, Discipline 
and Punish 202).  The panopticon’s application extends to every establishment where a 
number of persons need to be inspected.  In every application, it perfects power over the 
individual (Foucault, Discipline and Punish 206).   
The circular cage of the panopticon, with its powerful and all knowing central 
tower, represents to Bentham not only a perfect disciplinary institution, but also a way to 
unlock disciplinary power throughout society as a whole (Foucault, Discipline and 
Punish 208-209).  We must therefore not consider the panopticon as an imaginary prison, 
but rather as an architectural vision of political technology which reduces power to its 
ideal form, that is, where the individual subject to the panopticon turns against his or her 
own self, transforming into both inspector and inspected (Foucault, Discipline and 
Punish 205).  Just as a state is both an individual state and within the World War 
Machine part of a collective of states, the individual within the panopticon is both 
inspector and inspected.  Addressing concerns of the panopticon’s relationship to 
potentially unchecked authority, Bentham claims that since any member of society has 
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the ability to observe how the panopticon works, there occurs no risk of the panoptic 
institution’s power turning into tyranny (Foucault, Discipline and Punish 207).  Because 
the panopticon claims to hand disciplinary power over to all members of a democratic 
society, panopticism spreads throughout the entire social body (Foucault, Discipline and 
Punish 208). Any panoptic institution subjects itself to irregular and constant inspection 
by both the employed inspector and the public.  Bentham envisions disciplinary 
mechanisms travelling everywhere, altering individual behavior toward a more ordered 
and predictable society.  Panopticism allows for the formation of a society riddled with 
disciplinary mechanisms (Foucault, Discipline and Punish 209). 
To demonstrate an early usage of social panopticism, Foucault uses the measures 
taken during an infestation of the plague in seventeenth-century towns.  During an 
outbreak, the town closes itself and divides into quarters, with an attendant ruling over 
each quarter.  Every single street avails itself to a syndicate who keeps it surveilled 
(Foucault, Discipline and Punish 195).  Instructed to make their own provisions, families 
pack themselves into their houses while town officials ration bread and wine from a 
distance using ropes and pulleys.  Fish, meats, and herbs get hoisted up the houses via 
baskets.  No communication takes place.  In the town, segmented, immobilized, and 
frozen, each individual acquires his place (Foucault, Discipline and Punish 195).   
At each town gate, an observation post stands.  Sentinels patrol every street.  Each 
day, syndicates check on the residents and logs their status.  Foucault calls this, “the great 
review of the living and the dead” (Foucault, Discipline and Punish 196).  This particular 
system of surveillance has its basis in a system of permanent registration.  Syndicates 
report to the attendants, the attendants report to the magistrates, and so forth up the line of 
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command.  All things observable, deaths, illness, irregularities, etc. get noted and sent to 
the attendants and magistrates (Foucault, Discipline and Punish 196).  Five or six days 
after the beginning of the quarantine, the purification of each house begins.  After 
perfuming the house, searches of the workers begins as to ensure that they leave with 
nothing which they had not brought into the house (Foucault, Discipline and Punish 197).  
The workers carrying out surveillance are surveilled.  Foucault writes: 
This enclosed, segmented space, observed at every point, in which the 
individuals are inserted in a fixed place, in which the slightest movements 
are supervised, in which all events are recorded, in which an uninterrupted 
work of writing links the center and periphery, in which power is 
exercised without division, according to a continuous hierarchical figure, 
in which each individual is constantly located, examined and distributed 
among the living beings, the sick and the dead – all this constitutes a 
compact model of the disciplinary mechanism.  (Foucault, Discipline and 
Punish 197) 
 
Order works antithetical to the plague by confining and limiting its possibility of 
movement.  It gives each man his place, his body, his disease, and his death.  The plague 
filled town gives rise to disciplinary projects (Foucault, Discipline and Punish 198). 
As Foucault examines the early roots of panopticism in a plague town, 
geographers Nicholas R Fyfe and Jon Bannister examine the development of surveillance 
in modern public spaces by focusing on the town center surveillance system installed in 
Glasgow in the 1990s.  Once reserved for what Fyfe and Bannister call panoptic malls, 
private places of concentrated inspection, surveillance cameras have increasingly entered 
into spaces owned by the public, turning public spaces into locations of intense 
surveillance (37).  Surveillance schemes alter public space to accommodate surveillance.  
In Glasgow, city space and private buildings were rearranged to produce a more 
automatic surveillance (Fyfe and Bannister 39).  Municipal authorities and local 
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businesses created a network of city center surveillance through a program called City 
Watch, envisioned as a crime prevention network designed to produce obedient 
consumers in Glasgow (Fyfe and Bannister 39-40).  Surveillance purifies public space of 
the presence of difference, of the poor, the homeless, and any persons not strictly 
controlled for (43). 
 Municipal government in Glasgow oversaw the installation of eighteen foot tall 
poles while local businesses made the necessary alterations to their buildings to 
accommodate surveillance system installation (Fyfe and Bannister 39-40).  Fyfe and 
Bannister point out that crime deterrence, real or perceived, is not the only impact of 
surveillance in public space.  Surveillance schemes enhance in individuals under 
inspection a feel good confidence in the areas under surveillance (Fyfe and Bannister 42).  
Surveillance alters the environments under its inspection and the thought processes of 
individuals in surveilled environments.  As surveillance alters our mental processes to be 
more accepting of surveillance, public support for surveillance systems in public space 
remains high (Fyfe and Bannister 43).  Just as the asylum produces individuals supportive 
of confinement, surveillance produces individuals supportive of surveillance. 
Surveillance integrates itself throughout all life in modern societies (Danaher, 
Schirato, and Webb 54).  In the last several decades panopticism has emerged as the 
norm.  As Christian Parenti, author of The Soft Cage, puts it, “[e]veryday surveillance has 
increased to sci-fi proportions” (Parenti 1).  Panopticism as the norm comes as a result of 
computers, databanks, networks, credit card statements, medical records, criminal records, 
and other readily accessible pieces of data (Parenti 1).  Our everyday tasks, like shopping, 
buying, driving, etc, leave trails of information which businesses and governments track 
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and map (Parenti 2).  For example, cellular phones create an electronic account of the 
owner’s whereabouts.  Transmitters monitor and record the phone’s location whenever 
the owner turns the device on.  Phone companies store these records, which government 
institutions later subpoena.  Commercial organizations also mine through the data for 
their own financial purposes (Parenti 2). 
 The American federal government ordered cellular phone companies to create a 
system for tracking phone locations in real time as well.  As a result, each cellular device 
created now carries a Global Positioning System chip (Parenti 2).  The chip transmits the 
device’s location to satellites owned by the pentagon.  Any owner of a cellular phone 
voluntarily turns his self over to the inspector.  Government officials pour over these 
records to create a portrait of group behavior and to make detailed calculations about an 
individual’s routine (Parenti 2). 
Observation and discipline run parallel to our society’s inevitable conversion into 
a cashless society where technocrats track the location and identity of every buyer and 
seller (Parenti 3).  Over the next decades, consumers will begin carrying smart cards in 
their wallets.  Unlike credit cards, smart cards not only dispense data but also record and 
maintain data.  A plastic chip in a person’s wallet will come to know more about its 
owner than perhaps what that owner’s own spouse knows about him or her (Parenti 4). 
 As states collectivize to produce global order, the inspector, on behalf of the logic 
of the World War Machine, subjects all of society to internment by designing for us a 
panoptic world.  Add to smart cards and cellular phones all other technological 
innovations which our society cherishes:  navigation devices, computers, etc.  Now add to 
each device a plethora of corporate and governmental regulations and codes of conduct.  
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Banks all across the United States require thumb prints while many use iris scanners at 
their ATM machines (Parenti 4-5).  Panoptic machines surround us on a daily basis. 
 Within the hidden matrix of internment the panopticon creates internment camps 
so small and subtle that the camps remain almost invisible.  The World War Machine 
exercises its power through permanent and omniscient surveillance.  The panopticon 
must make all of society visible (Foucault, Discipline and Punish 214).  When a person 
makes a phone call or sends an email, the National Security Agency and its allies record 
it through the world’s largest surveillance network known as Echelon (Kroft).  Echelon’s 
supposed mission consists of spying on terrorists, drug cartels, and foreign enemies. Yet 
as those groups remain designated enemies, the World War Machine uses Echelon as a 
means of applying surveillance to all individuals.  Regardless of the NSA’s mission 
statement, its computers capture and record nearly every electronic conversation in the 
world (Kroft). 
 According to Steve Kroft, the co-host of 60 minutes, cellular phones, faxes, and 
even ATM transmissions fill the air around us with electronic data.  Echelon collects and 
analyses every bit of it.  Mike Frost, who worked in the Canadian equivalent of the NSA 
for twenty years, states that Echelon grips the entire planet, analyzing and recording 
(Kroft).  Even the chatter between parents over baby-monitors slips into Echelon’s grasp.  
As Frost puts it, “Baby monitors give you a lot of intelligence” (Kroft).  The international 
use of Echelon further illustrations the global nature of the World War Machine, as the 
World War Machine overtakes the interests of individual states and uses their resources 
to cover the world in surveillance.  Former Congressional representative Bob Barr, from 
Georgia, explains that even members of Congress have difficulty obtaining information 
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when attempting to request such from the NSA concerning Echelon (Kroft).  Foucault 
notes that panoptic power hands itself over to the king (Foucault, Discipline and Punish 
214).  In the framework of the world political order, panoptic power hands itself over not 
to the state, as Congressman Barr’s observation indicates, but, rather, over to the World 
War Machine. 
 Inside globes at each NSA spy-station, satellite dishes record communications 
from around the world (Kroft).  In Bentham’s prison, information travels from the 
prisoners through copper tubes to the inspector (Bentham).  In the modern age, people 
transform into prisoners, satellites represent copper tubes, and NSA mainframes represent 
the inspector in the central tower of the panopticon.   
 When the co-host of 60 Minutes asks Mike Frost about the possibility of Echelon 
targeting innocent civilians, Frost replies, “Not only possible, not only probably, but 
factual.”  Mike Frost cites as an example: 
While I was at CSE, a classic example:  A lady had been to a school play 
the night before, and her son was in the school play and she thought he did 
a-a lousy job.  Next morning, she was talking on the telephone to her 
friend, and she said to her friend something like this, “Oh, Danny really 
bombed last night,” just like that.  The computer spit that conversation out.  
The analyst that was looking at it was not sure about what the 
conversation w-was referring to, so erring on the side of caution, he listed 
that lady and her phone number in the database as a possible terrorist. 
(Kroft) 
 
The World War Machine uses Echelon and other surveillance programs, much like 
internment camps, as a means of creating a network of surveillance able to locate the 
Unspecified Enemy.  The World War Machine uses surveillance to neutralize the 
Unspecified Enemy through categorization and exclusion, through dividing practices.  
Once known, a potential enemy of the World War Machine no longer remains an enemy. 
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There are even more subtle manifestations of surveillance in everyday life.  In 
Power/Knowledge, Foucault briefly mentions surveillance in relation to the school 
system.  He discusses the normalization that goes on in the school system, specifically 
mentioning the school’s need to normalize its students (Foucault, Power/Knowledge 150).  
Technological efforts abound to allow schools to monitor students’ whereabouts at all 
times and in all places.  Some schools make use of facial recognition technology and 
employ it in the classroom (Keenan 127).  Many schools use surveillance cameras in 
every classroom, even in elementary classrooms.  The stated goal is deterring 
misbehavior (Keenan 127).  Surveillance works toward modifying a child’s behavior in 
an effort to normalize him or her into a model student.  Concerning the panopticon’s 
efficiency in regards to the school system, Bentham claims, “All play, all chattering – in 
short, all distraction of every kind, is effectually banished by the central and covered 
situation of the master, seconded by partitions or screens between the scholars, as slight 
as you please” (Bentham).  Regardless of the institution and its stated goals, the 
panopticon moves through the institution normalizing those who participate in it. 
 The inspector acts as much more than society’s authority.  Through panoptic 
power the inspector enters and possesses each individual.  An individual’s socialization 
involves learning to turn his or her self into his or her own subject of surveillance.  
Individuals constantly place their thoughts and actions in check (Danaher, Schirato, and 
Webb 54).  The World War Machine uses the panopticon to perpetuate not only models 
of normalization but also individuals able to understand that normalization.  For example, 
the way a woman looks represents an integral part of how western society views females, 
as well as how they view themselves.  Most magazines portray women with supermodel 
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bodies on the front cover.  Women viewing the cover of the magazine posit the cover girl 
as their role model (Danaher, Schirato, and Webb 54).  To achieve this desired beauty, 
people regularly discipline themselves.  They cover their flesh with hot wax to remove 
hair, exercise until they fall from exhaustion, starve themselves, etc (Danaher, Schirato, 
and Webb 55).  Some people, thoroughly given over to panoptic power, seek on the one 
hand to shrink the size of their bodies and yet simultaneously increase the size of certain 
appendages.  They opt to have their breasts sliced and ripped apart and filled with 
material to make them look more like the magazines’ objects of desire.  Much like the 
World War Machine produces individuals able to understand order through war, the 
panopticon normalizes individuals into understanding the desire for a body to 
simultaneously shrink and grow. 
 Panoptic surveillance occurs throughout the whole of society.  People, socialized 
in surveillance and normalization, place themselves simultaneously in the panopticon’s 
hidden matrix of internment and the panopticon’s central tower, all in an effort to receive 
a socially normal label, as subject categorized and defined.  Even where internment does 
not manifest as immediately visible, internment still occurs.  As surveillance integrates a 
hidden matrix of internment and death through the smallest spaces of modern existence, 
the modern political order cannot escape from internment so long as each individual 
remains known by the World War Machine.
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Chapter Three 
 
Fall of the World War Machine 
 
Panoptic internment marks existence for the subject living in the striated space of 
the World War Machine. In the striated space of the World War Machine, the subject is 
opened not only to confinement but also to the perpetual being of death through the logic 
of the camp.  The logic of the camp, however, ensures not only the continual experience 
of death but also the possibility of annihilation of the subject by the World War Machine.  
Deleuze and Guattari’s definition of the Unspecified Enemy of the World War Machine 
as “multiform, maneuvering and omnipresent… the unassignable material 
Saboteur…assuming the most diverse forms” provides a means for the subject to break 
the straight-jacket of modern confinement and perpetual internment (Thousand Plateaus 
422).  The image of the Unspecified Enemy as multiform and omnipresent provides the 
subject of confinement with a roadmap for leaving confinement and entering a plan of 
immanence. Yet entering a plan of immanence requires not a journey to some destination 
but rather an internal journey where the subject comes to create space for herself.   
Alison Brown writes in Foucault’s Play that freedom in the context of Foucault’s 
politics consists of a constant working toward self-disengagement (211).  Brown 
indicates that for Foucault freedom represents a political endeavor that we practice by 
constantly disengaging from notions of self (211).  By disengaging from pre-defined 
notions of self the subject creates smooth space and through smooth space journeys into a 
70 
 
plane of immanence where the individual no longer remains subject to the World War 
Machine and the technologies of confinement that drive it.  In a plane of immanence
the individual transforms into pure possibility, into an undefined individual with limitless 
possibility.  The individual exits the madhouse and the panoptic machines that surround it 
and enters an open space of creation.  As the individual exits panoptic control the 
individual also exits the perpetual death of the camp and reengages with life.  By 
reengaging life and awakening to possibility the individual becomes the Unspecified 
Enemy and brings about the possibility of the fall of the World War Machine. 
Awakening to life first requires that the individual attempting to exit a panoptic 
machine learns to stop identifying with confinement.  Jnana yoga provides a means by 
which an individual can remove the false identifications of self that mark his or her 
perpetual confinement.  Deleuze and Guattari understand the departure from categorized 
identity in terms of the body. They postulate the body able to create smooth space as a 
Body without Organs, or a BwO.  The BwO does not merely occupy smooth space, as 
smooth space can be striated.  The BwO perpetually creates smooth space by virtue of its 
indefinable being.  The BwO exists without segregation and confinement into categories.  
The individual engaged in creating smooth space enters what Deleuze and Guattari refer 
to as a plane of immanence, an infinitely open space where the individual exists without 
defined form and without perpetual segregation.  In a plane of immanence the individual 
transforms into pure immanence, a state of omnipresent being whose very existence as an 
unspecified and indefinable mode of being-in-the-world sabotages the World War 
Machine and the technologies of confinement that drive it. 
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Deleuze and Guattari understand the process of developing a BwO as a multiform 
and omnipresent yoga, a practice of discerning that we are ultimately not defined by our 
personas (Anti-Oedipus 150-151, 422).  Jnana yoga, a yogic practice of discernment, 
therefore provides a means for the development of a BwO.  The Latin word persona from 
which we derive our word “personality” originally referred to masks worn by actors 
through which the actor played his part.  The mask separated human from act, the 
individual from the emotions displayed.  For the Jnana yogi the connection occurring 
between our word for personality and the wearing of masks holds significance given the 
ways in which people tend to wear certain notions of self as they move about in the world.  
Wearing the mask creates problems in relation to self-identification when the wearer 
assumes that his mask, his personality, is a direct manifestation of his true Self.  For the 
yogi, Self refers to an ever present and undefined person infinitely full of possibility; self 
refers to a perpetually defined, narcissistic person disjoined from the world.  The Jnana 
yogi works in part at the task of removing self-identification through masks, finding 
underneath the mask the “anonymous” and “joyfully unconcerned” Self (Smith 30).  
Antonin Artraud writes in his play To Have Done with the Judgment of God “When you 
will have made him a body without organs, then you will have delivered him from all his 
automatic reactions and restored him to his true freedom.”  The Body without Organs 
implies an openness and freedom of movement removed from the automatic reactionary 
personality, removed from the automated and reactionary series of masks.  Deleuze and 
Guattari describe the Body without Organs as a stationary voyage and a kind of yoga.  
They write that while the psychoanalyst tells the individual to stop and find her self, the 
necessary direction toward openness, or toward the opening of the self, requires a 
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continuation of the voyage in search of the Body without Organs, a voyage that 
necessitates renewed dismantling of the self (Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus 151).   
The individual cannot approach the task of the removal of masks through the 
recognition of a concept alone.  Deleuze and Guattari point out the task of dismantling 
the self requires more than a lack of “I” or “me” in language and thought.  Robert 
O’Toole writes in “Contagium Vivum Philosophia” that “It no longer matters whether 
one says ‘I’ anymore, merely that one is dynamite” (167).  Regardless of the preference 
for saying ‘I’ one should engage the world dynamically and with great vigor.  “I” or a 
lack of “I” constitutes a linguistic preference only then, for the BwO does not reject the 
existence of organs in the body, in the same way that the Jnana yogi does not entirely 
avoid the masks of personality, rather the BwO moves in its voyage past the necessity of 
the development of organs into an organism.  In other words, the BwO moves not against 
masks as indicators of self but past the wearing of a series of masks as Self and in doing 
so takes a journey into a plane of pure immanence where the individual becomes 
omnipresent.  By doing so, the BwO dismantles the World War Machine. 
 
1.  Jnana Yoga or a Mystical Reawakening of Life 
Jnana yogis seek omnipresence through reflective knowledge, where knowledge 
is understood as intuitive discernment that transforms, “turning the knower eventually 
into what she knows” (Smith 29).  Ideas for Jnana yogis constitute a vital quality of life.  
Intuitive thought in and of itself has vitality as mental substance animates life.  As the 
yogi begins understanding omnipresence the yogi notices the yogi’s own emergence into 
omnipresence, oneness with omniversality, oneness with Life itself.  The key to the 
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project of oneness unfolds as a kind of power to distinguish between the layers of the 
surface self that occupy a person’s attention and the vastly larger Self that operates out of 
sight.  Jnana yogis cultivate this power often in three steps.  The first entails study of 
scripture and philosophical treatises.  The yogi acquaints herself with the theoretical, in 
preparation for the realization, the idea that she exists as, underneath all surface layers, 
continuous omniversality.  The second step taken by the Jnana yogi embodies protracted 
mindfulness which transforms the first step of theoretical contemplation into a realized 
actuality.  Thirdly, through intense reflections Jnana yogis transform their theoretical 
understanding of omnipresence into an omnipresent life (Smith 30). 
The mask of personality “registered the whole,” keeping the actor underneath it 
hidden and detached from the emotions enacted during a play (Smith 30).  The 
description of the word “personality” as a mask that keeps us hidden from life fits 
precisely with the Jnana yogic conception of how individuals move about life, segregated 
from the rest of the world.  The mask of personality produces a confinement in motion 
much like the straight jacket in the madhouse.  The purpose for Jnana yogis then of 
actualizing omnipresence realizes itself not through a mere rejection of masks, as 
sometimes nearly every person acts on a stage, but rather through understanding that 
individuals have an irreducible relationship with masks.  The individual wears, not 
identifies with, a mask.  The Jnana yogi seeks to unmask the misidentification of identity 
and reveal omnipresence from within.  The Jnana yogi accomplishes this through turning 
her reflection, indeed her awareness, inward so as to peel back the layers of her 
personality until she reaches “the anonymous, joyfully unconcerned actress who stands 
beneath” (Smith 30).  The yogi, continuing such reflections, eventually experiences the 
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beginnings of the third step and induces an awakened sense of the infinite Self that lies 
beneath our finite masks.  Eventually the yogi identifies with the infinite Self and no 
longer with the masked self (Smith 32-33).  The masked self only represents an act.  The 
yogi lives in the world as a manifestation of the omniverse, as pure spirit and pure 
possibility. 
Peter Marchand, a practitioner of Jnana yoga, states in a lecture on the techniques 
of Jnana yoga that when one finds the truth there remains nothing to be done (Jnana 
Technique).  The yogi can only stop, for when one stops the inner Self moves to visible 
form.  Marchand uses the word stop not as a verb, to stop in the yogic sense implies to 
stop all forced action in relation to the self whatsoever.  If one seeks a technique to 
practice Jnana yoga, the method of stopping embodies such a technique (Marchand, 
Jnana Technique).  When one stops stopping and starting altogether one experiences true 
omnipresence, recognizing that all beings exist in perpetual motion of various relations of 
speed.  The Jnana yogi recognizes that there is no beginning and no end.  Marchand 
explains in Jnana Technique, “There is no path, wherever you go your Self goes with you 
because you are it.  You cannot even run away from it.  Stop everything else.  Stop even 
the stopping.”  To stop implies no effort.  Marchand likens stopping to going to sleep, 
when all thoughts and worries of the day no longer grab at our attention (Jnana 
Technique). In this practice, stopping resembles sleeping while awake.  It constitutes not 
a stopping of life however, as it may easily be misconstrued by some.  Rather, stopping 
ceases all attempts at finding and seeking after illusory modes of life and self definitions.  
When a person awakens in this way to the infinite Self she truly lives.  When one sleeps, 
one awakens.  When one stops, one begins to live. 
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If a path exists in any form it occupies not some linear trail of connection points 
of singular intersection but rather exhibits a circle where the masked actor walks around 
and around the infinite Self, the omnipresent Self.  The infinite Self appears so close that 
a person may exclaim that one cannot walk around omnipresence and so cannot walk a 
path even in a circle, and such an observation conveys omniversal intuition.  Marchand 
states in his lecture, “It is not even a step, you have to stop stepping.  You have to stop 
going somewhere, you have to be silent” (Jnana Technique).  At that moment of silence 
one awakens to the infinite Self.  Jnana yoga prescribes no path for the yogi the end at 
which promises one finding one’s self.  One’s self constitutes only another mask.  Jnana 
yoga entails then a kind of inward voyage through and beyond the constituted selves and 
into the infinite Self.  “Into” denotes not a destination but a perspective, a kind of 
awakening to omnipresence (Marchand, Jnana Technique).   
Marchand states in his lecture on the techniques of Jnana yoga that in the 
beginning of Self awareness people often stay silent for only a few seconds (Jnana 
Technique).  They find longer periods of silence more difficult to maintain, but even 
those few seconds provide the person taking the inner voyage of Jnana yoga a vast 
amount of intuitive knowledge.  When the silence breaks, the main cause bears not on 
what one does but rather “the main thing is who is doing it” (Marchand, Jnana 
Technique).  In Jnana yoga one must give up doership, or rather recognize that the doer 
acts only in an illusory sense for one cannot even speak of a doer in any real sense.  
Identity engages itself as a doer, but identity exists only as illusion.  Therefore, we cannot 
say with any exactitude that a doer exists at all.  “[In Jnana yoga] to give up doership is 
very important, whatever needs to be done is done” (Marchand, Jnana Technique).  To 
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give up on the doer implies giving up on the labelling of identity.  All things in life, in 
Being, embody a Becoming of meditation, of silence.  The individual’s reference to 
herself occurs as illusion.  Her appeal to “I” and “me” cast facades of deception, as what 
cannot exist cannot truly deceive.  Pure silence makes pure possibility a visible space.  As 
pure possibility comes into view so too does the possibility of human community based 
on values other than confinement of human potential.  Charles E. Winquist writes of 
silence in his article “Theology: Unsettled and Unsettling,” “Nothingness and silence are 
mysteries that cease to be themselves as soon as they are written or spoken” (1028).  
Humans cease to be themselves the moment they are born into panoptic community.  
Humans under panoptic surveillance embody an assigned category.  Doership and its 
implication of an insulated identity must cease before silence and therefore omnipresence 
can permeate the body of a person taking an inward voyage toward a plane of immanence.  
As one person takes an inward voyage toward a plane of immanence, that person begins 
creating space for the possibility of creative human community. 
In Jnana yoga one observes the play of life without fundamentally identifying 
with it.  Whatever experiences she has, the Jnana yogi responds by saying that she 
watches the experiences happen.  This approach entails introspection and a close 
awareness of one’s mental processes; however, the mind seeks to move away from the 
person trying to watch it and so it will struggle against her.  It will mislead and persuade 
her to stop watching it.  The mind, addled by countless panoptic institutions of 
confinement, constitutes such a powerful force that it has the ability to drag her attention 
wherever it goes unless the yogi practices extreme vigilance.  The segregated mind seeks 
to divert attention away from what it focuses on.  The yogi must observe this with 
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patience and return to the witness state.  The yogi takes care not to fight the mind but 
rather to gently guide it into silence.  In this regard the Jnana yogi sometimes employs a 
mantra such as, “OM Sakshi Aham” (Devananda 114-115).  The mantra reminds the yogi 
that the yogi witnesses all of her actions.  In this way the yogi practices viveka or 
discernment.  Viveka involves a continuous effort to understand the Self and understand it 
as something more than the objects of immediate awareness.  The Jnana yogi applies the 
phrase neti-neti, meaning “not this not this,” to objects of immediate awareness 
(realization.org).  As the Jnana yogi repeats neti-neti the yogi avoids the false sense that 
external objects constitute an identity.  With the repetition of the practice of non-
identification and vicara, or self-inquiry, the yogi’s masks are pulled back and her 
identification with self vanishes.  The Jnana yogi finds in the emptiness the Infinite Self 
(realization.org).  She finds omnipresence. 
Nietzsche uses his character Zarathustra to provide an image of a person 
struggling with identity in “The Stillest Hour” section of Thus Spoke Zarathustra (257).  
Zarathustra considers returning to solitude for his angry mistress, who, for Nietzsche, 
embodies life, spoke to him in a dream in his stillest hour.  As Zarathustra’s dream begins, 
the clock of his life draws a breath and, because he had never heard such stillness around 
him, his heart takes fright.  A voice speaks to Zarathustra, “You know it, Zarathustra, but 
you do not say it!”  He replies that yes he knows it but does not want to say it.  “Do not 
hide in your defiance,” the voice replies.  He cries and trembles and says, “Alas, I would 
like to, but how can I?  Let me off from this!  It is beyond my strength!”  (Nietzsche 257).  
In this encounter, Zarathustra does not realize the strength and boundlessness of his 
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infinite-Self.  Zarathustra seeks strength in self rather than Self.  Zarathustra does not 
recognize his own omnipresence and so hides behind a mask of defiance.   
Zarathustra’s mistress replies to him, “What do you matter, Zarathustra?  Speak 
your word and break!”  Zarathustra’s mistress seems to tell him to break the mask he 
hides behind.  Zarathustra responds by questioning his worth and his concept of self.  “I 
await the worthier one; I am not worthy even of being broken by it” he replies (Nietzsche 
258).   His doubt continues on until she replies, “You are the one who has forgotten to 
obey: now you shall command.  Do you not know who is most needed by all?  He that 
commands great things.  To do great things is difficult, but to command great things is 
more difficult.  This is what is most unforgivable in you: you have the power, and you do 
not want to rule” (Nietzsche 258).  At this chasm of doubt Zarathustra denies the 
greatness of Self and instead seeks strength in his self and finds it lacking.  Zarathustra 
replies that he lacks the lion’s voice for commanding.  Zarathustra’s mistress replies 
further, “It is the stillest words that bring on the storm.  Thoughts that come on doves’ 
feet guide the world.  O Zarathustra, you shall go as a shadow of that which must come: 
thus you will command and, commanding lead the way” (Nietzsche 259).  But what does 
Zarathustra matter?  Identity constitutes only illusion.  Break she commands, break!  
Break the mask of perpetual internment and in doing so destroy the illusion of self and 
reawaken as omnipresent life. 
 
2.  The Body without Organs 
As the individual on an inward voyage toward a plane of immanence begins to 
break the illusions that before constituted identity the individual begins to resemble 
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Deleuze and Guattari’s Body without Organs.  Antonin Artraud writes in his play To 
Have Done with the Judgment of God, that when the body becomes a body without 
organs, the body is delivered from automatic reactions and is restored to true freedom.  
The Body without Organs exemplifies openness and freedom of movement removed 
from the automatic reactionary personality, removed from the automated and reactionary 
series of masks.  The BwO occurs alongside pure potentiality and smooth space.  The 
BwO comes underway the moment the body has had enough of the organs that define it 
and the body attempts to break from organs (Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus 150).  
Deleuze and Guattari give warning however that such a break from identification implies 
danger.   
Deleuze and Guattari give examples of the sick bodies that resemble a BwO but 
that in fact constitute sick organisms comprised of sick organs: the hypochondriac body, 
the paranoid body, the schizo body, and finally the masochist body.  Deleuze and 
Guattari first write about the hypochondriac body.  The organs appear destroyed and once 
the damage appears nothing more occurs.  When the hypochondriac claims her organs are 
destroyed, she leaves a body of dreary skin and fragile bones.  The hypochondriac has a 
disorganized body full of sick organs (Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus 150).  As in 
Jnana yoga where the masks of personality are not destroyed but rather peeled back, one 
must not destroy the bodily organism.  Damaged organs cause more suffering than 
healthy ones in the defined and delineated organism.  Second, Deleuze and Guattari warn 
about the paranoid body.  Here the organs appear under constant attack by outside forces 
and yet also appear restored by other outside forces.  Deleuze and Guattari write: “He 
lives for a long time without a stomach, without intestines, almost without lungs, with a 
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torn esophagus, without a bladder, and with shattered ribs.  He used sometimes to 
swallow parts of his own larynx with his food, etc.  But divine miracles (rays) always 
restored what had been destroyed” (Anti-Oedipus 150).  Here the person seeking the 
BwO seeks both destruction and restoration from the outside. Yet the journey to the BwO, 
the infinite Self, signifies an inward journey.  Seeking deconstruction or recompense 
from the outside invites only paranoia.  Omnipresence occurs within.  Deleuze and 
Guattari describe the third body as schizo.  The schizo body wages its own “active 
internal struggle against the organs” (Anti-Oedipus 150).  The journey to omnipresence 
implies no active journey however, and the organs constitute no enemy against whom one 
wages war.  Just as the nomad does not seek out confrontation with the state apparatus, 
the BwO does not seek confrontation with the organs.  The organs embody no existence 
whatsoever.  Why wage war against something that cannot exist?  To wage war against 
the organs allows the organs to embody the definitional limits of the organism.  Finally 
the masochist body, the body sewn up and the organs sewn shut and flayed, represents 
not a healthy BwO but a sick body.  It represents a body of organs shut off from the 
world and from life (Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus 150). 
Deleuze and Guattari ask “Why such a dreary parade of sucked-dry, catatonicized, 
vitrified, sewn-up bodies, when the BwO is also full of gaiety, ecstasy, and dance?  So 
why these examples?...What happened?  Were you cautious enough?  Not wisdom, 
caution…Many have been defeated in this battle” (Anti-Oedipus 150).  Deleuze and 
Guattari demonstrate what the body can turn into when one begins to desire something 
other than a body full of organs.  One may easily mistake one’s sick body for a BwO 
without awareness of it, without discernment.  The organism would rather continue on as 
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a sick gaggle of organs than vanish into a BwO.  As in Jnana yoga where the false 
identity acts out and swindles the individual, the organism’s desire to continue its illusory 
existence occurs even in the face of sickness.  One must exercise much caution in this 
voyage.  Deleuze and Guattari, after exploring the possible dangers, bring into view an 
image of the yogic voyage into a plane of immanence as they write: 
Is it really so sad and dangerous to be fed up with seeing with your eyes, 
breathing with your lungs, swallowing with your mouth, talking with your 
tongue, thinking with your brain, having an anus and larynx, head and legs?  
Why not walk on your head, sing with your sinuses, see through your skin, 
breathe with your belly: the simple Thing, the Entity, the full Body, the 
stationary Voyage, Anorexia, cutaneous Vision, Yoga, Krishna, Love, 
Experimentation.  Where psychoanalysis says, “Stop, find your self 
again,” we should say instead, “Let’s go further still, we haven’t found our 
BwO yet, we haven’t sufficiently dismantled our self.”…Find your body 
without organs.  Find out how to make it.  It’s a question of life and death, 
youth and old age, sadness and joy.  It is where everything is played out. 
(Anti-Oedipus 150-151) 
 
Every organ represents not a defining character of a larger system or a larger organism, 
but pure possibility understood as utter potential not bound to one particular body 
function.  The BwO has the ability to see with its skin and to breathe with its belly.  At 
every moment every organ participates in life as pure possibility.  Deleuze and Guattari 
note that finding the BwO constitutes a kind of yoga and a kind of stationary voyage.  
One goes on a voyage not to some distant place in search of an identity of a new 
organism.  One goes on a voyage deep within the self, indeed beyond the self and into the 
infinitely omnipresent Self.   
Notice carefully that Deleuze and Guattari write that the journey requires moving 
beyond psychoanalytic advice to find the self.  When the healthy organism discovers its 
open nature as a BwO the organism no longer requires self exploration, as a self no 
longer exists for the organism to continue searching for.  At the very least the existence 
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of a self no longer matters.  The sick organism cannot make such a journey; it constitutes 
a matter of life and death.  The organism would rather die of its sickness than vanish.  
Whereas the sick organism obstructs its vision and makes itself sick, the BwO uses clear 
perception to become aware of its boundlessness.  Like in Jnana yoga, the BwO shifts its 
perspective away from an identity of singularity to an understanding of omnipresence.  
One must ultimately stop and experience the stationary voyage and in doing so gain new 
vision, a new vision with which to see life and with which to play at life.  One must gain 
a vision able to penetrate through the striated layers of illusion and false identity (Deleuze 
and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus 151). 
As the Jnana yogi opposes not the mask but rather the limitations that accompany 
their permanent placement, the BwO is situated not in opposition to organs but rather to 
their classification as a restricting scheme “which…tries to stop or interrupt the 
movement of deterritorialization” (Rio 72).  The BwO refuses to signify anything 
whatsoever; rather, it signifies no-thing at all (Blau 266).  It forms an existence that 
creates undefined open space, unobserved possibility.  The spatial locus of the BwO 
remains imperceptible from infinite existence.  That is, the BwO does not occupy some 
particular space in opposition to all other spaces.  The BwO occupies all possible space.  
For one to have a BwO means that one releases all fixations on singularities as permanent 
localities.  It means the opening of all energetic barriers that imprint upon us static 
concepts of self and other (Pearson 93).  In the BwO death no longer occurs.  Because 
death no longer occurs for the BwO the BwO overcomes the perpetual death of 
internment.  Only the infinite Self, omnipresence, remains for the BwO.  The mask, the 
play, at once the BwO manifests an organ but only for a moment.  Different 
83 
 
manifestations of the body, different organs or different masks, coalesce into a BwO, an 
infinite Self, which “disregards clearly defined borders or identities” (Rio).  Here the 
BwO freezes and produces an image of meaning, but only for a moment.  As quick as a 
classificatory scheme moves toward defining the BwO, the BwO liquefies again into pure 
potentiality (Michael and Still 873).  Masks may come and go but the healthy BwO 
remains fundamentally unaffected by them.  The BwO deterritorializes striated space, de-
delineating and de-stabilizing categories.  
Before moving forward, or even backwards or side to side, the inward voyager 
must first recognize the formation of the organism, of the classificatory body scheme full 
of defined organs working in a prescribed fashion in order to exhibit an approved subject.  
Deleuze and Guattari conceptually separate smooth space, or open space, from striated 
space claiming that smooth space is occupied without numerical tabulation, without 
notions of control and possession.  Counting, categorization, and management define the 
limits and boundaries inherent in striated space.  Striated space determines its occupancy 
in terms of separation and designation.  The royal science, employed by the World War 
Machine, binds, tabulates, defines, and imposes mechanisms of systematic delineation 
(Deleuze and Guattari, “Treatise on Nomadology” 281).  The apparatus of striation has a 
narcissistic nature and produces narcissistic bodies of organisms which proclaim “I, me, 
my.”  The royal science cannot conceptualize the existence of a space outside the 
boundaries of established categories.  Smooth space, space unfolded by the BwO, neither 
negates nor inverts.  It creates. 
Political identity theorist Leon Huddy writes that categorization of identity results 
not from passive activation of pre-existing identity, rather categorization results from 
84 
 
active political construction (134).  Identity in the context of political construction 
oscillates between perceived individual identity and social identity such that identity 
remains in a constant construction.  The dichotomy between individual identity and social 
identity marks a countervailing desire for both uniqueness and belonging (Huddy 134-
136).  Identity, much like the madman’s voyage across the sea, is both exclusive and 
inclusive.  Identity provides the illusion of uniqueness while simultaneously subjecting 
the individual to the commonality of repetitious labeling practices.  The process of self 
categorization all the while fulfils a politically constituted need for certainty (Huddy 136).  
The categorization of self dispels the tendency toward genuine phenomena of being and 
replaces it with the desire for an appearance of constancy. 
Constructed identity desires codification into demonstratively essential certainty 
in a constant process of identity management.  Contemporary politics produce a desire for 
an eternal recognition of authority as a means of finding and having acknowledged by 
others a politically true self (Huddy 138).  Contemporary politics therefore produce 
identities that at once strive for consistency and yet remain in pursuit of ever changing 
notions of essential self.  Huddy writes that political environments crystallize, intensify, 
and redirect identity (150.) 
Iris Young’s “The Scaling of Bodies and the Politics of Identity” narrates the 
categorization and development of a subject’s identity in what Deleuze and Guattari call 
striated space.  In this space a subject receives a tabulation and assignment into a 
particular paradigm of how to live and how the body should look while living.  Bodies 
not fitting these modal designations constitute things which a subject should avoid and, if 
necessary, discard.  Bodies cannot occupy smooth space and infinite possibility; they 
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must appear all at once in their designated space.  The closer that a body gets to 
appearing defined the more orderly a body becomes (Young 372).  The royal sciences 
order bodies into acceptability. 
The royal science has its own ranking schemes for its illusory categories.  Bodies 
appearing black, brown, homosexual, and/or too emotional all mark deviancy and 
insufficiency.  A body’s dark color and preference for other men and/or other women 
seemingly translates in the striated paradigm to being worth less than someone of lighter 
color and more acceptable emotions.  Characteristics of respectability provide not 
necessarily a sketch of what actually constitutes a respectable body, but rather a sketch of 
what the royal sciences consider respectable.  For Young, those characteristics involve 
the repression and/or reproduction of one’s sexuality, bodily operations, and emotional 
articulation (Young 372).  A system which seeks to produce certain kinds of bodies at the 
expense of possibility highly values defined parameters in the organisms it delineates.  
Even bodily excretions meet with hostility.  Young writes, “Abjection is 
expressed…to…matter expelled from the body’s insides: blood, pus, sweat, excrement, 
urine, vomit, menstrual fluid, and the smells associated with each of these” (377).  These 
functions of the body threaten the organism because once they are removed they carry the 
risk of crossing the boundaries of the self.  When the body expels parts of itself it reminds 
a person that the body is fundamentally impermanent and constantly in motion.  The 
self’s operation of internment requires the illusion of a static and essentially catatonic self.  
In striated space everything occupies its preset place in the world and the body moves 
into categories set by those boundaries.  If something crosses that boundary it threatens 
the very illusion of identity of the body.  Only with strict boundaries placed on the body 
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can striated space metamorphose into the illusion of identity.  The illusion of identity is 
so fundamentally fragile that a body recognized as in motion almost automatically breaks 
the illusion is labeled as insane or otherwise defective. 
The BwO represents a fundamental resistance, resistance as a deterritorialization, 
to defined space and modes of organized knowledge production.  Resistance, however, 
represents no defining quality of the BwO as the BwO constitutes positive force, not 
reactionary force.  The BwO arises and lives independently of defined space and so the 
BwO is not defined and limited by its own quality of resistance.  Resistance to defined 
spatial modalities comprises a by-product of the BwO’s positive force.  The BwO 
fundamentally shapes the act of creation by forming the production site of “positive 
forces and creative differences” (Oksala 118).  The BwO embodies a perpetual expansion 
of self-overcoming.  Jose Gil writes in the article “Paradoxical Body,” “It is in this sense 
that we can talk about the body…Not as an organism where we could find a global 
function operating in each part, but as…the assemblage of all possible assemblages” (30).  
The body actualizes as a boundless never-ending, producing what Deleuze and Guattari 
have called a BwO.   
At all moments the BwO engages in deterritorialization through the production of 
creation.  Deleuze and Guattari provide a brief mathematical sketch of deterritorialization, 
of open creative space, through Benoit Mandelbrot’s fractals.  Fractals, they explain, “are 
aggregates whose number of dimensions is fractional rather than whole, or else whole but 
with continuous variation in direction” (Deleuze and Guattari, Thousand Plateaus 486).  
Open space promotes creation in all directions and removes dimensional limitations.  
Deleuze and Guattari cite an example in Von Koch’s curve, a line segment whose central 
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position is replaced by an angle of an equilateral triangle.  This operation engages in 
repetition for the resulting segments ad infinitum.  The resulting segment constitutes an 
infinite line or curve.  Open space represents infinite possibility in the formation of new 
lines of movement.  Open space allows for a boundless line to continue metamorphosis 
into ever changing images.  The Koch line never begins, never ends, and always remains 
in motion.  Deleuze and Guattari write in A Thousand Plateaus that the space occupied 
by the BwO constitutes a multi dimensional, indeed omni dimensional, space as 
demonstrated in Von Koch’s curve: 
(487). 
Figure 1: Von Koch’s Curve 
The BwO frees a person from static form and substance and equally frees a person 
from either reflection or obscuration of the illusory world.  Whether the BwO appears to 
move or appears to remain still its image never composes a fixed image.  Rather, the 
BwO always occurs in a place in between movement and stillness, between movement 
and rest.  The BwO in its occupation of the between space of movement and stillness may 
always affect or open itself to affect by other images.  Whatever image may appear may 
never permanently fix itself on the BwO.  The BwO “instantiate[s] a process that 
deactualizes the affections [one] possesses in virtue of having been subjected to 
organization” (Rio 76).  Through the separation of images from the narrative of 
organization that binds them the BwO deactualizes the organized affections of striated 
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space and actualizes pure potentiality.  Rio continues, “The BwO consists of affections 
that are assembled without regard for dominant or hierarchical organizations” (76).  Why 
the body as a target for analysis?  Arguably Deleuze and Guattari first begin to formulate 
their understanding of the body from Foucault, but Foucault understands the body in a 
very Nietzschean way (Oksala 118).  Indeed Foucault formulated his understanding of 
the body largely based on his readings of Nietzsche, so we cannot proceed further in 
examining the implications of the BwO without first finding its Nietzschean roots. 
In Eric Blondel’s Nietzsche: The Body and Culture the importance of the body 
takes on an altogether familiar role.  The danger to the body involves a danger of loss, 
worked at by Blondel through the very real and bodily act of excretion that occurs rapidly 
and too often.  Rapid excretion constitutes a symptom of a weak body.  Blondel writes 
that most do not have the kind of stomach necessary to finish digestion of lived 
experience and that for such people the greatest of all novelties pass straight through 
them undigested (223).  The body as organism remains unable to experience life; the 
organism only digests illusion and despair.  The healthy body on the other hand, the BwO, 
experiences the heaviest and the spiciest of dishes; the healthy body engages in true 
digestion and true living.   
Blondel understands not only of the kind of body that Deleuze and Guattari refer 
to as an organism but also a sick body, a body that still has organs but sick and repulsive 
ones.  If a person remains unable to rid herself of psychological pain, the kind of pain 
associated with a sick organism, the cause lies not in her psyche but rather in her belly.  
The healthy individual digests experience, both deeds and misdeeds, just as she digests 
even the toughest of morsels.  When a person cannot finish with an experience, when that 
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experience defines life rather than life defining that experience, experiential indigestion 
emerges as physical indigestion.  A person’s inability to digest experience causes the 
stomach organ to appear in the body. They are often consequences of one another.   
Nietzsche adds something that immediately strikes an uncanny relationship with 
Deleuze and Guattari.  Nietzsche writes, “Let me add that one may hold such notions and 
yet be an enemy of all materialism” (Blondel 223).  The body repulsed by the organism 
and by the schemes of organism- production may still, and often will, fall prey to 
becoming a sick organism.  Even one who consciously rejects the material substratum of 
delineation can find that digesting the experiences of life present much difficulty for the 
sick.  Nietzsche explains the body in relation to confinement, “Slavery is necessary for 
the formation of a higher organism” (Blondel 230).  In the organism one finds 
subordination to classificatory systems.  One must therefore take a stationary voyage and 
transform into a Body without Organs. 
 
3.  A Plane of Immanence 
The BwO occupies what Deleuze and Guattari call the plane of immanence (Gil 
30).  Jo Nash’s “Mutant Spiritualities in a Secular Age” describes the plane of 
immanence as a mode of life involving a perpetual overcoming of binary divisions.  In 
the plane of immanence there are no manifestations of the inner and outer, of the self and 
other, of mind and body.  The plane of immanence harbors no such illusions.  For those 
consciously aware of the plane of immanence striated space no longer has an ability to 
subject people to dualistic forces of fragmentation and disintegration (Nash 325-326).  
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The plane of immanence presents a challenge to a system that undermines creativity and 
stifles imagination (Nash 326).   
In the plane of immanence one finds, much like in Jnana yoga, not a journey from 
a singularity to the plane of immanence but rather a rapid and incalculable spatial shift.  
The inward voyager makes the journey to the plane of immanence not by moving from 
one defined destination to another, but by deterritorializing the striated space around her 
and by doing so creating smooth space.  Rather than moving in her journey, the inward 
voyager unfolds movement.  Nick Nesbitt writes of the world of singularity, “the world in 
which individuals are…singularities reverts in its absolutism into a logic of absolute 
identity” (93).  The plane of immanence presents an opening of identity as a pure 
possibility of existence.  As the spatial shift in an individual’s consciousness transforms 
from the singularity of identity to the plane of immanence the individual all at once 
embodies omnipresence.  The individual reflects the omniverse in actuality and 
potentiality, indeed actuality and potentiality manifest as inseparable forces in the plane 
of immanence.  That actuality and potentiality appear indissoluble results from an 
unspoken but apparent refusal in the plane of immanence to engender closed systems and 
defined space.  Individuals shift in an endless play of pure possibility.   
 In the plane of immanence there no longer occurs invented form or defined 
category.  One finds no subjects and no formulation of subjects.  There appears no 
structure just as there appears no genesis (Deleuze and Guattari, Thousand Plateaus 266).  
Genesis implies a beginning and end, concepts incompatible with a plane of immanence.  
Rather than considering the plane of immanence as transcending genesis, the plane of 
immanence moves clear of the limitations inherent in a structure of beginnings and ends.  
91 
 
The plane of immanence embodies a constant overcoming of such limitations.  The 
inward voyager finds in the plane of immanence relations of movement, speed and rest 
found between unformed elements, molecules, and particles.  The plane of immanence 
deterritorializes striated space; it removes the barriers of segregated territory put in place 
by the technologies of confinement. 
The plane of immanence marks not esoteric space, rather it forms political space.  
As the yogic practitioner becomes a BwO and takes the stationary voyage to the plane of 
immanence the yogi deterritorializes confinement and works toward the freedom of all 
beings.  The yogic practioner Yogani relates the rise of inner silence that accompanies 
self-inquiry to a pathway toward freedom.  Yogani writes that as the yogi travels toward 
personal freedom she travels a path toward freedom for all beings (69).  The yogi 
gradually expands her perception such that she identifies with the world as an “endless 
flow of radiating interconnected energy, an expression of [her] own inner nature, which is 
blissful stillness” (Yogani 72).  The yogi expands her perception to envision the plane of 
immanence. 
As inner silence rises in the yogi and the yogi’s body becomes a BwO, the yogi’s 
relationship with the world occurs more dynamically than before.  As inner silence rises 
so too does freedom (Yogani 72-78).  The yogi expands freedom, making the world more 
open and more present.  The yogi expands joy and reduces anxiety in the world.  The 
yogi perceives a more omniversal world.  Through inner silence the yogi “becomes life 
itself” (Yogani 86-87).  As the yogi becomes life, the yogi enters a state of being most 
able to help others achieve the freedom of unbound potentiality.  In this way the 
stationary voyage constitutes a political voyage.  Foucault states that as we work toward 
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freedom what we do is political (McDonell 537).  Journeying into a plane of immanence 
marks a political journey, one that moves directly in the face of the World War Machine 
and the science of confinement that drives it. 
Deleuze and Guattari write “There are only…subjectless individuations that 
constitute collective assemblages” (Thousand Plateaus 266).  Appearances are collective 
assemblages that constitute an appearance for only a small length of temporal spatiality, 
having no sedimentary delineation or perpetual definition.  An appearance marks one of 
an infinite number of possibilities which that image can take.  Nothing develops in the 
plane of immanence, rather images arrive and form assemblages based on the speed of 
their transposition.  A plane of immanence constitutes a plane of composition occupied 
by nonsubjectified affects naturally opposed to the striated space of organization and 
development.  “It is necessarily a plane of immanence” (Deleuze and Guattari, Thousand 
Plateaus 266).  A plane of immanence constitutes a totality of all possible signs so that 
what emerges upon it has no category and no illusion.  A plane of immanence marks the 
realest of all realities.  Deleuze and Guattari write that that alone makes it both natural 
and immanent (Thousand Plateaus 266).   
A plane of immanence appears as a plane of both contradiction and 
noncontradiction, as both consistency and nonconsistency.  In this regard a geometrical 
plane not of mental design but of abstract design marks the plane of immanence as such 
(Deleuze and Guattari, Thousand Plateaus 266-267).  As what happens continues to 
happen on the plane of immanence; its dimensions increase and lose nothing.  It 
constitutes then a plane of creation and of peopling yet it creates not in a developmental 
or evolutionary sense.  Such forms dissolve in the plane of immanence and space and 
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time happen in free spatiality.  Deleuze and Guattari write, “It is the absolute state of 
movement as well as of rest, from which all relative speeds and slownesses spring, and 
nothing but them” (Thousand Plateaus 267).  The plane of immanence marks the plane 
from which all movement comes into the world.  Deleuze and Guattari continue, “Or 
rather it is a question of a freeing of time, Aeon, a nonpulsed time for a floating music, as 
Boulez says, an electronic music in which forms are replaced by pure modifications of 
speed” (Thousand Plateaus 267).  What occurs on the plane of immanence then comes to 
the world as movements in variations of speed and slowness rather than the decrepitude 
and nonmovement that accompany defined space and carved time.  When a BwO 
perceives eternal movement, a BwO perceives the plane of immanence.  Marchand writes, 
“A rock might not seem very much alive because your senses are too limited…to see 
movement…if you were to enhance your senses…you would see that at the molecular, 
atomic, and subatomic levels, that rock is vibrating, pulsating, moving” (Yoga of Truth 
51). 
 Deleuze and Guattari write that Nietzsche conceives of the plane of immanence as 
well although by different means (Thousand Plateaus 269).  There no longer occurs in 
Nietzsche’s work any development or forms or formations of subjects.  Indeed Nietzsche 
criticizes Wagner for keeping too much form, too much Hegel and Goethe.  In Nietzsche, 
one finds not form but.  Rather, speeds and slownesses, “not writing slowly or rapidly, 
but rather writing, and everything else besides, as a production of speeds and slownesses 
between particles.  No form will resist that, no character or subject will survive it” 
(Deleuze and Guattari, Thousand Plateaus 269).  Nietzsche’s eternal return, the life of the 
eternal return, marks the first mass freeing of nonpulsed time.  Classificatory schemes 
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defining sectors of time cannot resist the openness inherent in the plane of immanence.  
The unbound movement of the BwO washes away the separation of stratification. 
 The inward voyage to a plane of immanence, Jnana yoga, implies a 
destratification of all segregation.  It brings into view the BwO and the pulling back of all 
masks, the pure relations of speed and slowness between particles.  It deterritorializes 
striated space and desubjectifies the subject invented by the technologies of confinement.  
Deleuze and Guattari write, “[The plane of immanence] does not pre-exist the movement 
of deterritorialization that unravel it, the lines of flight that draw it and cause it to rise to 
the surface, the becomings that compose it” (Thousand Plateaus 270).   
Martin Luther King is an example of a BwO operating in a plane of immanence.  
As he marched in opposition to segregation his very movement deterritorialized the 
striated space around him.  By deterritorializing segregated space, Martin Luther King 
made possible the creation of a political community wherein people live and love in 
relation to and in the context of other people.  Martin Luther King referred to a political 
community of cooperation and love as “The Beloved Community” (Marsh 1).  In this 
community people are no longer tabulated and segregated.  People are joined together in 
emerging possibilities of sisterhood and brotherhood (Marsh 3). 
Deleuze and Guattari write however that the World War Machine, the plane of 
striated space and of striated knowledge, tries to plug the lines of flight and interrupt the 
movements of deterritorialization.  The World War Machine attempts to restratify the 
lines of flight and reconstitute forms and subjects (Deleuze and Guattari, Thousand 
Plateaus 270).  The World War Machine’s attempt conversely represents a double edged 
sword though as a plane of immanence, once brushed against, causes particles to spin off 
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the strata, causes all form and definition to scramble.  Deleuze and Guattari call again 
here for caution, lest those having too difficult a time shifting into the plane of 
immanence find only abolition in its wake.  To shift one must stop shifting.  One must 
stop altogether for omnipresence to emerge.   
By taking an inward journey into a plane of immanence a BwO transforms into an 
omnipresent creator of human possibility and community and by doing so becomes a 
saboteur of the confinement of the World War Machine.  A plane of immanence 
generates possibility that in turn creates space for human community, whereas the World 
War Machine creates camps through confinement.  There occurs in the 
deterritorialization of self-as-identity into infinite-Self the possibility of the fall of the 
World War Machine and the royal science of confinement that drives it.  A person 
entering a plane of immanence emerges as a being of deterritorialization, a being that in 
its very movement deterritorializes the confined space around it.   
There occurs the possibility of freedom, yet not freedom from some thing.  
Freedom means that who we are is never merely given, never constituted.  Freedom 
entails limitless possibilities in who we are and who we are becoming (Rajchman 96).  In 
the plane of immanence the voyager remains undefined, always in motion, and has 
boundless potential to become all things and no-thing.  In the unbound potentiality of the 
plane of immanence the inward voyager perceives the infinite-Self and overcomes the 
World War Machine.  As the BwO, the yogic voyager, deterritorializes self, the BwO 
deterritorializes the boundaries of the World War Machine and in doing so becomes a 
saboteur, the Unspecified Enemy, and causes the fall of the World War Machine.
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